







Policy and academic debates often depict agencies as siloed, in solitary 
pursuit of their own statutory mandates. But such views overlook an important 
reality. Agencies do not work alone, but in fact exercise power via networks, in 
tandem with other federal and state agencies as well as foreign powers. While 
agencies have relied on networks for decades, the study of coordinated agency 
action has been slow to catch up. This inattention is particularly acute for 
enforcement, which can be a black box, with much of enforcement activity 
taking place outside of the public view. 
This Article takes a novel approach to investigating how domestic and 
international agencies coordinate in civil investigation and enforcement. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) often acknowledges coordination 
when it announces its enforcement actions, noting that it “appreciates the 
assistance of” or “thanks the following agencies for their cooperation and 
assistance.” The Article uses these acknowledgments to develop a tool—
“automated acknowledgment indexing”—for evaluating and quantifying 
agency networks. Analyzing more than two decades of SEC acknowledgments 
(1998–2018) reveals a complicated network of domestic and international 
agencies. The study offers a window into the SEC’s enforcement network, with 
implications for agency practices and structures, and models a tool for 
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Introduction 
Academic and policy debates often conceptualize federal agencies as 
working as singular units. Deregulation debates focus on the actions of 
particular agencies—for example, whether the enforcement activities of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) are bad for business.1 Political 
movements talk about abolishing Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
for draconian enforcement behavior.2 Scholars and journalists talk about what 
 
1.  See, e.g., Mick Mulvaney, Message from the Acting Director, in CONSUMER FINANCE 
PROTECTION BUREAU, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
(2018), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_semi-annual-report_spring-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NGH8-4KDE] (“The power [the Director of the Bureau] wields could all too easily be 
used to harm consumers, destroy businesses, or arbitrarily remake American financial markets.”). 
2. See, e.g., Julianne Hing, What Does It Mean to Abolish ICE?, THE NATION (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/mean-abolish-ice [https://perma.cc/8R6Y-SU5C]; Gregory Krieg, 
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the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should or should not do in 
enforcement actions.3 Whether viewed as heroes or villains of a particular 
narrative, federal agencies are often cast as solo actors. 
But, as this Article shows, such views overlook an important reality. 
Federal agencies do not work alone but in fact exercise power via networks, in 
tandem with other federal and state agencies as well as foreign powers. Many 
modern problems—money laundering, environmental degradation, investor 
fraud, cryptocurrency abuses—cannot be effectively addressed by solitary 
agencies. Instead cross-border and borderless problems require a coordinated 
response from multiple entities in separate locations with different expertise 
and roles. They require, in other words, a network. 
While agencies have relied on networks for decades, the study of 
coordinated agency action has been slow to catch up. The administrative-law 
literature, for instance, has only recently looked beyond the single agency to 
coordination among agencies, and to date it has focused on their role as 
rulemakers.4 Where they exist, studies of coordination among agencies often 
focus on centralized attempts to coordinate, on bilateral relationships, or on 
international interactions.5 
This inattention is particularly acute for enforcement: investigation and 
actions to remedy or punish legal violations.6 Enforcement is a key part of 
 
3. See, e.g.,  Jean Eaglesham & Michael Rapoport, SEC Gets Busy With Accounting 
Investigations, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-gets-busy-with-
accounting-investigations-1421797895 [https://perma.cc/W7WZ-FJCA]; Gretchen Morgenson, SEC 
Wants the Sinners to Own Up, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/15/business/sec-wants-the-sinners-to-own-up.html 
[https://perma.cc/HDD8-D92Y]; Matt Taibbi, SEC: Taking on Big Firms Is “Tempting,” but We Prefer 
Picking on Little Guys, ROLLING STONE (May 30, 2012), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-
news/sec-taking-on-big-firms-is-tempting-but-we-prefer-picking-on-little-guys-185851 
[https://perma.cc/7LC2-V75T]. 
4. See Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805 
(2015) (noting this focus on rulemaking and reviewing the literature); see also Eric Biber, The More the 
Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of Administrative Law Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78 
(2011) (identifying open questions in the administrative-law literature about multi-agency rulemaking 
and policy formation); Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745 
(2011) (examining horizontal interactions among U.S. federal agencies, with a focus on how they 
constrain each other); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012) (defining “shared regulatory space” primarily in terms of policy 
setting); Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2013) (analyzing how U.S. 
federal agencies borrow and contribute expertise to address regulatory problems); Cass Sunstein, The 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013) 
(discussing the role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) as a centralized 
coordinator of rules). 
5. See, e.g., Joshua C. Macey, Note, Playing Nicely: How Judges Can Improve Dodd-Frank 
and Foster Interagency Collaboration, 126 YALE L.J. 806 (2017) (discussing coordination between the 
SEC and CFTC); Anthony O’Rourke, Parallel Enforcement and Agency Interdependence, 77 MD. L. 
REV. 985 (2018) (interviewing prosecutors and SEC and CFTC staff to analyze parallel criminal and 
civil enforcement); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1839-40 (discussing centralized coordination attempts at 
OIRA); infra note 19 (surveying the literature on international interactions among securities regulators). 
6. Boundaries among categories of adjudication, enforcement, and rulemaking can be difficult 
to draw. This Article borrows from the SEC’s pragmatic division into “Regulatory Cooperation” and 





making statutes and rules meaningful and can establish and express general 
agency policy.7 But enforcement and investigation can be a black box, with 
much enforcement activity taking place outside the public view. 
This Article takes a novel approach to investigating and quantifying how 
domestic and international agencies coordinate in civil investigation and 
enforcement. It re-envisions agencies and other enforcing entities as nodes in a 
graph or network.8 This invites the use of a new set of tools, especially those 
from areas of study where network analysis is quite developed. It thus 
participates in a nascent literature that applies tools of network analysis to law 
and legal structures.9 
Drawing on computer and information-science analyses of social 
networks,10 the Article models a specific tool for studying enforcement 
networks: automated acknowledgment indexing. It uses this tool to develop a 
case study of the SEC’s enforcement network. The proxy for interagency 
connections is the list of organizations that the SEC thanks when it announces 
its enforcement actions. These publicly available litigation and press releases 
often close with an acknowledgment of coordination: the SEC “appreciates the 
assistance of . . .” or “thanks the following agencies for their cooperation and 
assistance . . . .” Taking advantage of this routine practice, a computer program 
was developed to extract and index the names of the acknowledged entities.11 
This Article reports the results from 1998 through 2018. 
The multidecade study of acknowledgments reveals a network 
characterized by a few repeat players and many more one shotters. Many of the 
repeat players are the usual suspects: U.S. Attorney’s Offices (USAOs), the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Financial Industry Regulatory 
 
exchange of supervisory material,” while enforcement cooperation “facilitate[s] the ability of securities 
regulators to assist one another in investigations and prosecutions.” SEC’s Cooperative Arrangements 
with Foreign Regulators, SEC (Oct. 20, 2012) 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_coopfactsheet.htm [https://perma.cc/W2CL-K6K6]. The 
SEC’s definition refers to cross-border assistance, but the description of enforcement applies equally in 
the mixed international and domestic context here. 
7. See, e.g., ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA (1982). 
8. Although the Article uses new tools, it builds on the existing literature about networks in 
law, particularly in the global context. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 
(2004). 
9. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, THE CHESSBOARD AND THE WEB: STRATEGIES OF 
CONNECTION IN A NETWORKED WORLD (2017); Ryan Whalen, Legal Networks: The Promises and 
Challenges of Legal Network Analysis, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 539. 
10. See C. Lee Giles & Isaac G. Councill, Who Gets Acknowledged: Measuring Scientific 
Contributions Through Automatic Acknowledgment Indexing, 101 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 
17599 (2004); Madian Khabsa et al., Towards Building and Analyzing a Social Network of 
Acknowledgments in Scientific and Academic Documents, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL 
COMPUTING, BEHAVIORAL-CULTURAL MODELING, AND PREDICTION 357-64 (William G. Kennedy et al. 
eds., 2012). 
11. Chaoyun Chen, then a graduate student in the Information School at the University of 
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, developed the program for this project. Aditya Kadrekar provided later 
extension and developed additional programs. 
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Authority (FINRA) and its predecessors. These few entities account for half of 
all of the acknowledgments. But the top ten list also includes others who have 
received less attention, such as U.S. Postal Inspectors. 
Outside of the top ten is a long list of varied entities that the SEC 
acknowledges only once or at most a few times: Hampshire Constabulary, 
Texas Railroad Commission, City of Chicago, etc. These entities are roughly 
equally divided among federal, private (such as stock exchanges), state and 
local, and international entities. Global coordination is accordingly part of the 
story of the SEC’s network, but so is coordination between federal and state 
authorities domestically. 
The SEC provides a useful focus for this analytical tool. The agency is 
central to securities regulation in the United States. It therefore is a likely 
contact point for international securities regulators and, domestically, for state 
securities regulators. It also serves a coordinating and oversight role for self-
regulatory organizations (SROs), such as stock exchanges and FINRA. 
Moreover, although much of investigation and enforcement happens behind 
closed doors, the agency has a long history of publicly reporting the results of 
its enforcement activities through its public releases and annual reports. 
That said, the tools developed here in the context of the SEC’s 
enforcement network could be used effectively elsewhere. Some other 
agencies’ enforcement activities are closely analogous. For example, the 
enforcement division of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
issues public releases that acknowledge coordination.12 Moreover, like the 
SEC, the CFTC is a signatory to international and domestic memoranda of 
understanding (MOUs).13 Similarly, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
“recognize[d] the substantial assistance of the SEC” and the assistance of the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) in a multimillion dollar 
fraud action.14 Beyond these close comparisons, structured legal documents 
provide a rich source for the type of automated process modeled here. 
The study provides an essential—and missing—empirical underpinning 
for theorizing agency coordination. Although the approach has limitations,15 
tracking the SEC’s acknowledgments identifies agency enforcement 
interactions that would otherwise be invisible to the public eye. It provides new 
 
12. See, e.g., Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Sues Forex Dealer for Registration and Disclosure 
Violations (July 31, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7765-18 
[https://perma.cc/6QB4-K32D] (“The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the Financial Supervision 
Commission of Bulgaria.”). 
13. See infra Appendix A (noting that the CFTC is also a signatory to some of the SEC’s 
international MOUs). 
14. Press Release, DOJ, Former Chairman of Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Sentenced to 30 Years 
in Prison and Ordered to Forfeit $38.5 Million (June 30, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-
chairman-taylor-bean-whitaker-sentenced-30-years-prison-and-ordered-forfeit-385 
[https://perma.cc/YFX4-MEXL] (“The case is being prosecuted by . . . the Criminal Division’s Fraud 
Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys . . . of the Eastern District of Virginia. This case was investigated 
by SIGTARP, FBI’s Washington Field Office, FDIC-OIG, HUD-OIG, FHFA-OIG and the IRS-CI.”). 





information and a new tool for quantifying interactions that cannot be detected 
through a study of formal structures and agreements. 
Figuring out what the enforcement network looks like—who is in it and 
how the entities interact—is a necessary first step in addressing normative 
questions. The data alone cannot answer whether having an enforcement 
network is good or bad.16 For instance, the study does not resolve competing 
views about the utility of multiple regulators and whether overlap leads to 
undesirable “piling on”17 or useful redundancy.18 But its findings provide an 
empirical foundation for these questions. 
For areas such as international financial regulation that are already 
concerned with coordination,19 the study also provides a view of the network as 
a whole. It avoids the partial view that comes from focusing on international 
coordination alone, instead developing a nuanced picture that includes 
domestic federal, state, and private coordination as well. 
More broadly, the complexified picture of the boundaries of federal 
agency action raises questions at the heart of the regulatory state: the proper 
exercise of enforcement and rulemaking power, jurisdictional boundaries, and 
whether courts should broaden the scope of their inquiries into agency 
discretion. These central questions are worthy of renewed examination with the 
networked agency (rather than the solo actor) in mind. 
The Article begins in Part I by establishing the context for enforcement 
networks and the approach this Article takes to studying them. It identifies 
categories of contemporary problems and describes the networked responses 
they provoke. It then introduces the legal network framework for analyzing 
both the problems and the responses. 
 
16. Cf. Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How it Doesn’t), 99 
GEO. L.J. 257, 268-70 (2011) (noting that the literature often assumes that coordination is posititive, and 
complicating that account). 
17. Letter from Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. 
Att’ys (May 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1061186/download 
[https://perma.cc/FAW8-QVA5] (regarding policy on coordination of corporate resolution penalties); 
Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks to the New York City Bar White Collar Crime Institute 
(May 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-rosenstein-delivers-
remarks-new-york-city-bar-white-collar [https://perma.cc/J5QT-YPGR] (“[W]e should discourage 
disproportionate enforcement of laws by multiple authorities. In football, the term ‘piling on’ refers to a 
player jumping on a pile of other players after the opponent is already tackled. Our new policy 
discourages ‘piling on.’”). 
18. Cf. Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 285 
(2016) (drawing on literatures in engineering and public administration to argue that enforcement 
redundancy can “reduce errors, increase resources, aggregate information, and improve monitoring” in 
certain circumstances). 
19. See, e.g., Brummer, supra note 16; Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 
98 CALIF. L. REV. 327 (2010); Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial 
Regulation, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 447 (2008); Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets As 
Regulators, A Survey, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (2007); David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global 
Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 685 (2012); David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in 
International Law, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563 (2008). 
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Part II turns to the study of the SEC’s enforcement network. It begins by 
outlining the agency’s formalized cooperative arrangements, especially the 
MOUs that the SEC has entered with domestic and international actors. This 
Part lays the groundwork for understanding the interaction between the 
informal acknowledgment network and enforcement interactions more broadly 
at the SEC, with an eye to how much the contacts reflected in the 
acknowledgments should be viewed as supporting more formal coordination 
agreements and how much acknowledgments capture standalone, informal 
coordination. 
Part III reports the methodology and findings of the study of the SEC’s 
acknowledgments, including the process of automated indexing. It describes 
the underlying source material and the program developed to map the SEC’s 
acknowledgments. It reports results for the time period January 1, 1998 to 
December 31, 2018. It also highlights some of the relevant findings—and open 
questions—about how and why agencies acknowledge other entities at all. 
Implications of these data are taken up in Part IV. It uses the findings to 
examine the balance between informal and formal enforcement coordination 
and to integrate the international coordination function with the interaction 
among domestic entities. Here again the focus is two-fold: on the SEC and 
enforcement, but also on developing tools for understanding agency networks 
more generally. The Article then briefly concludes. 
I. The Framework 
A.  Cross-border and Borderless Problems 
Many contemporary problems involve multiple jurisdictions or are 
untethered to any physical location. The categories and examples in this section 
are intended as a reminder that the networked response grows out of a global 
structure that is increasingly taken for granted.  The discussion of cross-border, 
borderless, and bordered problems below thus serves as a brief but necessary 
prelude to the analysis of enforcement responses that follows. 
One classic cross-border problem arose in the context of trading losses by 
the so-called “London Whale.” In 2012, a JPMorgan trader lost almost six 
billion dollars using a trading strategy that the bank itself later called “flawed, 
complex, poorly reviewed, poorly executed, and poorly monitored.”20 The 
problem was cross-border in that it involved a London-based trader in a U.S.-
 
20. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 70458 ¶ 26 (Sept. 19, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70458.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAF6-2DJK] (quoting 





organized investment bank21 and crossed national boundaries, involving two or 
more countries and their regulatory systems. And, in fact, regulators from both 
countries ultimately responded to the conduct, as is described in the next 
section. 
The notion of “cross-border” that describes the London Whale does not 
capture a new set of problems driven by technological development. Initial 
Coin Offerings (ICOs) and cryptocurrencies are good examples. One of their 
central characteristics is the lack of physical presence and boundaries.22 The 
misuse of these digital currencies and ICOs can be thought of as borderless 
problems. While not all borderless problems implicate multiple regulators, 
addressing them often requires coordination to avoid gaps in a regulatory and 
enforcement system that has long been based on geographic and national 
boundaries.23 
These examples of cross-border and borderless problems are taken from 
the SEC and financial market contexts, but the list is obviously non-exclusive. 
Other examples are environmental degradation, money laundering, terrorism, 
and drug and human trafficking.24 Because of their ubiquity, it might make 
more sense to ask whether any bordered problems can be identified. 
One indication that bordered problems may be difficult to identify is that 
even problems within national boundaries cross jurisdictions, particularly in 
federal systems. Even within the United States, state-to-state and agency-to-
agency coordination are needed. 
B. Networked Responses 
Just as it is difficult to think of purely local problems, it is difficult to 
think of purely local solutions. How do regulators and other governmental 
authorities respond to cross-border and borderless problems? Take the example 
of the London Whale described above.25 In 2013, the SEC charged JPMorgan 
Chase with failing to detect and prevent these massive trading losses and with 
 
21. Id. at ¶¶ 12-13 (describing JPMorgan as “a global banking and financial services firm” 
organized as a Delaware corporation and trading on The New York Stock Exchange, and describing the 
particular unit in which the trader worked as having offices in both New York and London). 
22. See, e.g., Iris M. Barsan, Legal Challenges of Initial Coin Offerings (ICO), 3 REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER 54 (2017); Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking 
Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271 (2015). 
23. See, e.g., Stephen Peikin, Co-Dir., Div. of Enf’t, SEC, The Salutary Effects of 
International Cooperation on SEC Enforcement: Remarks at the IOSCO/PIFS-Harvard Law School 
Global Certificate Program for Regulators of Securities Markets (Dec. 3, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peikin-120318 [https://perma.cc/FC4C-FBZV] (listing 
“cryptoassets and ICOs” as one of the enforcement areas involving the “most transnational activity and, 
accordingly, the need for international cooperation”). 
24. See, e.g., ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: HOW EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED TO 
EVERYTHING ELSE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS, SCIENCE, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2003); 
SLAUGHTER, supra note 9. 
25. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
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misstating its financial results.26 The investment bank agreed to pay a $200 
million penalty to settle the SEC action.27 In some sense this was an 
enforcement action by the SEC. But it was not an action only by the SEC. It 
was an action by an enforcement network. 
Indeed, in its related press release, the SEC thanked multiple entities. It 
indicated that it “appreciate[d] the coordination of the U.K. Financial Conduct 
Authority, Federal Reserve, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency as 
well as the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of 
New York, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.”28 Some of 
the acknowledged entities brought their own enforcement actions based on the 
same conduct (so-called “parallel actions”), but the SEC thanked other entities 
as well.29 
The SEC enforcement staff specifically tied its response to the London 
Whale to the need for international coordination in global securities markets. A 
statement by the SEC’s codirector of enforcement thanked the United Kingdom 
Financial Conduct Authority for “its tremendous collaboration” in the London 
Whale matter. Coordination was required, he said, because of the global 
securities market in which “many of the leading participants. . . operate all over 
the world.”30 
Complex cases like this one—involving cross-border conduct in New 
York and London—cannot be effectively investigated and prosecuted without 
close cooperation of financial regulators in different countries. Such 
cooperation is vital not only in developing the evidence of wrongdoing but in 
determining the appropriate regulatory response, including assessment of 
sanctions that reflect JPMorgan’s violation of the distinct laws in both 
countries but avoid duplication of punishment for the same conduct.31 
More generally, cross-agency collaboration is explicitly one of the SEC’s 
aims. The SEC’s fiscal year 2017 Annual Report pointed to the close work 
“with other agencies and foreign governments” and “regular[] collaborat[ion] 
 
26. JP Morgan Case & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 70458 (Sept. 19, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70458.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAF6-2DJK]; Press Release, 
SEC, JPMorgan Chase Agrees to Pay $200 Million and Admits Wrongdoing to Settle SEC Charges 
(Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539819965 
[https://perma.cc/PQX4-HSPL]. 
27. Press Release, supra note 26. 
28. Id. 
29. The related CFTC press releases reported parallel actions by the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC), U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Federal Reserve 
and the UK Office of Serious Frauds division. See Press Release, U.S. CFTC, CFTC Files and Settles 
Charges Against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., for Violating Prohibition on Manipulative Conduct In 
Connection with “London Whale” Swaps Trades (Oct. 16, 2013), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6737-13 [https://perma.cc/NA86-3LTC]. 
30. Public Statement, George Canellos, Co-Dir., Div. of Enf., SEC, Statement on SEC 







with both internal and external partners” as strategic goals.32 The SEC 
Enforcement Manual similarly points to the importance of coordination among 
agencies.33 
A specific example of a networked response to a borderless problem is 
“Operation Cryptosweep,”34 which involves the North American Securities 
Administrators Association (NASAA), an association of subnational securities 
regulators within the United States, Mexico, and Canada.35 In spring 2018, 
NASAA and its member state and regional securities enforcement agencies 
created a task group.36 This coordinated activity was designed to address “the 
persistently expanding exploitation of the crypto ecosystem by fraudsters,” 
which NASAA identified as “a significant threat to Main Street investors.”37 
Under the task force’s umbrella, state securities regulators brought enforcement 
actions and investigations, described by NASAA as a “Coordinated 
International Crypto Crackdown.”38 
The examples above are drawn from the SEC and financial enforcement, 
but one could make a similar point using examples from criminal law (think 
INTERPOL, but also coordination under mutual legal assistance treaties), 
environmental law (think multilateral environmental agreements, or statutory 
regimes like the Clean Air Act that rely on cooperative federalism), and other 
contexts. 
Much the same structure can be observed in criminal enforcement, which 
has become increasingly internationalized.39 One scholar of international 
criminal law noted a shift “from unilateral operations conducted by national 
agencies” to “the development of organizations that encourage wide 
 
32. SEC, FISCAL YEAR 2019 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION ANNUAL 
PERFORMANCE PLAN AND FISCAL YEAR 2017 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 87 (2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/secfy19congbudgjust.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG9A-8YKJ] [hereinafter SEC, 
2019 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION]; see also SEC, STRATEGIC PLAN, FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022: DRAFT FOR 
COMMENT 7 (June 2018), https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-strategic-plan-2018-2022.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DX42-PWY5] (noting that the “need for coordination with fellow financial regulators, 
including foreign regulators, will continue to rise,” pointing to “global risks” and the U.S. effects of 
“wrongdoing [that] occurs outside our country [the United States]”). 
33. SEC, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 82-95 (Nov. 28, 2017) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT 
MANUAL], https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HDU-
2G7P]. 
34. Bob Webster, State and Provincial Securities Regulators Conduct Coordinated 
International Crypto Crackdown, N. AM. SECS. ADMIN. ASS’N (May 21, 2018), 
http://www.nasaa.org/45121/state-and-provincial-securities-regulators-conduct-coordinated-
international-crypto-crackdown-2 [https://perma.cc/6N5Q-H36H]. 
35. NASAA 2017 Enforcement Report Based on 2016 Data, N. AM. SECS. ADMIN. ASS’N 1 
(Sept. 2017), http://nasaa.cdn.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2017-Enforcement-
Report-Based-on-2016-Data.pdf [https://perma.cc/XWM5-DHP4] (describing the organization). 
36. Webster, supra note 34. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Mathieu Deflem, & Michael D. Bayer, International Law Enforcement, in THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1168-73 (Jay S. Albanese ed., 2014). 
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multilateral cooperation on a permanent basis,”40 such as INTERPOL and, in 
the securities context, IOSCO. Interestingly, observers of the internationalizing 
criminal-law context have also noted a companion to the multilateral 
cooperation organization: “temporary and limited forms of cooperation 
between agencies from two or more nations, usually for specific 
investigations.”41 In this and other contexts, networked responses seem a 
natural consequence of the characteristics of borderless and  cross-border 
problems. 
C. Legal Network Analysis 
In-depth study of a single agency, or the interaction among a few entities, 
or between civil and criminal authorities, has many precedents in the legal 
literature. But the study of more complex legal networks of enforcement has 
been more limited to date. The tools used to study the interactions among two 
or three agencies simply do not work to make sense of more complicated and 
multinodal/multidirectional activity. 
Networks are ubiquitous, so it is unsurprising that a set of tools has been 
developed to study networked activity. Networks are not limited to one issue or 
area. The study of networks and the tools used are accordingly deeply 
interdisciplinary, with participation from computer science, math, political 
science, sociology, and other disciplines.42 
Moreover, commentators, scholars, and lawyers have increasingly applied 
notions and tools from network analysis and theory to law and legal studies. 
Existing legal network studies often examine interactions among cases43 or 
statutory provisions,44 but there is no reason to limit them to these contexts.45 
Part of the job of these studies, including the one reported here, is to figure out 




42. BARABÁSI, supra note 24; ERNESTO ESTRADA & PHILIP A. KNIGHT, A FIRST COURSE IN 
NETWORK THEORY (2015); SLAUGHTER, supra note 9. 
43. See, e.g., James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 
SOC. NETWORKS 1 (2008); James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal 
Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 Pol. Analysis 324 (2007); Fabien Tarissan & 
Raphaelle Nollez-Goldbach, Analysing the First Case of the International Criminal Court from a 
Network Science Perspective, 4 J. COMPLEX NETWORKS 616 (2016); Marc van Opijnen, A Model for 
Automated Rating of Case Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONVERENCE 
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW—ICAIL ’13, at 140 (2013); Paul Zhang & Lavanya Koppaka, 
Semantics-Based Legal Citation Network, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW—ICAIL ’07, at 123 (2007). 
44. See, e.g., Marios Koniaris et al., Legislation as a Complex Network: Modelling and 
Analysis of European Union Legal Sources, in 271 FRONTIERS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND 
APPLICATIONS 143-52 (Rinke Hoekstra ed., 2014). 






questions. This study of the SEC demonstrates one tool, pointing both to its 
limits and to its promise. 
Another literature about networks that is directly related to this study of 
the SEC’s enforcement network is the body of work outside legal scholarship 
that studies citations and acknowledgments, usually acknowledgments by 
authors of scientific or academic work.46 Some early network analyses studied 
the nature of a network in the context of scientific and academic coauthoring 
and citations, in part because the connections were formally documented.47 
This allowed the study of how regular the network was, how random, how 
clustered, how many links each entity had—many of the questions taken up in 
the analysis of the SEC’s network below. Acknowledgments offer some of the 
same advantages as coauthoring and citations.48 The connections are 
observable and reflect some underlying interaction.49 
II. Formal Coordination at the SEC 
Cross-border and borderless problems are ubiquitous, as are networked 
responses. But that observation gets us only so far. This Part and the next hone 
in on one concrete example: the SEC’s enforcement network. 
SEC enforcement actions often begin with an information source. These 
can be varied and include information from whistleblowers, external tips and 
complaints, internal and external referrals, and/or market surveillance. It may 
include information from an entity—local, state, federal, or international—that 
has a formal arrangement with the SEC and/or is ultimately acknowledged by 
the SEC. The SEC staff reviews the initial information, in addition to market 
intelligence, to see if it is within the agency’s jurisdiction (e.g., does the 
misconduct concern securities). After deciding to start an enforcement action, 
the SEC investigates, first informally and then, with more centralized approval, 
formally. Instituting a formal investigation triggers a series of interactions with 
the target, the target’s lawyers, and the Commission.50 
This Part outlines the formal framework for cooperation between the SEC 
and other organizations provided by statutes, rules, memoranda of 
understanding (MOUs), and other arrangements. The international area is well 
documented, and coordination in this area is self-consciously part of the SEC’s 
 
46. See, e.g., Giles & Councill, supra note 10; Khabsa, supra note 10; Mark E.J. Newman, 
Who Is the Best Connected Scientist?: A Study of Scientific Coauthorship Networks, in COMPLEX 
NETWORKS 337-70 (Eli Ben-Naim et al. eds., 2004). 
47. See BARABÁSI, supra note 24. 
48. Giles & Councill, supra note 10; Khabsa, supra note 10. 
49. Potential underlying interactions in the SEC enforcement context are discussed infra 
Section III.B.2. 
50. See generally THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 
(Richard M. Phillips ed., 2d ed. 2007); ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 33. 
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mission. The SEC has an Office for International Affairs (OIA)51 and provides 
a list of its international agreements.52 The Co-Director of SEC Enforcement 
gave a speech in December 2018 called “The Salutary Effects of International 
Cooperation on SEC Enforcement” that pointed to “critical” collaboration with 
“international regulators and law enforcement.”53 
But interagency cooperation is not limited to the international sphere. 
Some of the same concerns about coordination and information sharing arise 
when the interaction is between states, among different agencies, or between 
other relevant jurisdictions. The SEC’s domestic MOUs with the U.S. 
Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and other agencies are more 
scattered and are often overlooked in the literature. Including domestic MOUs 
in the study helps demonstrate that agency networks include both domestic and 
international entities: a theme that runs through the study of SEC 
acknowledgments. 
The exploration of these formal enforcement interactions, both domestic 
and international, provides further evidence that it makes sense to think of 
agencies as part of an enforcement network—rejecting the solo-actor 
conception of an agency. It also provides context for interpreting the results of 
the study of SEC acknowledgments. Are the acknowledgments additional to 
other contacts, or do they reinforce existing agreements? What underlying 
relationship does the acknowledgment represent? This Part provides the 
information about formal coordination that is needed to formulate a response. 
A. Form 
Statutes play a limited role in shaping coordination among agencies. 
Indeed, one of their main functions has to do with the agency in isolation: 
statutes define the agency’s individual mandate and scope of jurisdiction. A 
classic example of a contested boundary is the interaction and sometimes 
overlap between the jurisdictions of the SEC and the CFTC.54 The 
jurisdictional statutes leave gaps, some of which are filled by the type of formal 
and informal coordination discussed below. 
Beyond defining jurisdiction, statutes sometimes authorize cross-agency 
coordination. One such example is the statutory provision allowing 
coordination between federal and state securities authorities. The Securities Act 
of 1933 (“Securities Act”) explicitly permits the SEC to “cooperate, coordinate, 
 
51. Office of Int’l Affairs, About the Office, SEC (May 20, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/oia 
[https://perma.cc/DBX3-AHP3]. 
52. Cooperative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators, SEC (Mar. 14, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_cooparrangements.shtml [https://perma.cc/GP2F-PKVD] 
(providing a list of international MOUs to which the SEC is party). 
53. Peikin, supra note 23. 






and share information” with state securities regulators for certain purposes.55 
The statute permits but does not dictate coordination. Part of the space is filled 
by the SEC’s Rules Relating to Investigations, which allow upper-level staff of 
the SEC to “discuss nonpublic information. . . with state regulatory agencies,” 
and “show (but not release) documents.”56 The above example concerns 
coordination with domestic authorities, but similar statutory and regulatory 
authorization exists for cooperating and sharing information with non-U.S. 
securities regulators as well.57 
Occasionally statutes will mandate particular coordination structures. One 
example is the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which was 
created by Dodd-Frank, and in which nine federal agencies have membership.58 
International conventions also establish some subject-matter-specific 
obligations. In foreign bribery cases, for instance, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
provides for consultation among signatories with shared jurisdiction.59 But, in 
general, statutes, rules, and other hard law have a limited role in determining 
how and when agencies coordinate. 
Instead the interactions are formally defined by centralized and bilateral 
agreements such as MOUs. These MOUs are, on their own terms, not legally 
binding.60 But they are the main way that securities regulators can formally and 
 
55. Securities Act of 1933, § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(d) (2018) (permitting cooperation with “any 
association composed of duly constituted representatives of State governments whose primary 
assignment is the regulation of the securities”). Most of these purposes relate to regulation and 
registration, but they also include broader categories, such as “maximum effectiveness of regulation.” 
Id. 
56. 17 C.F.R. § 203.2 (2019); ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 33, § 2.2.2.3 (“Pursuant to 
Rule 2 of the SEC’s Rules Relating to Investigations, the staff at the Assistant Director level or higher 
can discuss nonpublic information, including whether the staff has or will commence an investigation, 
with state regulatory agencies, and can show (but not release) documents.”); see also id. at § 5.1 (noting 
that “[c]ooperation and coordination with other law enforcement agencies often require the staff to 
engage in discussions of nonpublic information prior to the grant of a formal access request”). 
57. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 3(1), 21(a)(2), 24, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(50), 78u(2), 
78x(c) (2018); SEC Rule 24c, 17 C.F.R. § 240.24c-1 (2019). 
58. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). Members are the SEC, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, CFTC, 
FDIC, Federal Housing Finance Agency, National Credit Union Administration, OCC, Treasury 
Department, and CFPB. Financial Stability Oversight Council Member Agencies, U.S. DEP’T 
TREASURY (Oct. 24, 2012), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/FSOC-Member-
Agencies.aspx [https://perma.cc/9P4W-ANPK]. 
59. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Convention on Combatting Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 37 ILM 1 (Feb. 15, 1999), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BGZ-AEH5]. 
60. See, e.g., Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and 
Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, INT’L ORG. SEC. COMMISSIONS 3 (May 2012), 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD386.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UWC-GAPP] 
[hereinafter IOSCO MMOU]  (“The provisions of this Memorandum of Understanding are not intended 
to create legally binding obligations . . . .”). 
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publicly express commitment to coordination.61 The SEC’s international and 
domestic MOUs are listed in this Article’s Appendices. 
Sometimes these agreements formalize the interactions with a centralized, 
coordinating agency. International enforcement coordination is primarily 
governed by a multilateral MOU (MMOU) reached under the auspices of the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), a global group 
of securities regulators.62 As of June 2018, 118 IOSCO members—including 
the SEC—had signed the IOSCO MMOU on enforcement.63 The IOSCO 
MMOU was entered into in 2002 and revised in 2012. The SEC became a 
signatory in November 2002.64 
A centralized, coordinating organization also exists at the U.S. 
subnational level, with state and regional securities authorities organized into 
the NASAA.65 One of NASAA’s express functions is to enable its members to 
“participate in multi-state enforcement actions and information sharing.”66 This 
function is not just on paper. The organization reports ingoing and outgoing 
enforcement referrals among U.S. regulators.67 MOUs define some aspects of 
the relationship between NASAA and the SEC.68 
 
61. See Brummer, supra note 16, at 263 (pointing out that regulators lack power to enter into 
treaties and that often these agreements are entered with formality and commitment, complicating the 
“soft law” label); Michael D. Mann et al., The Establishment of International Mechanisms for Enforcing 
Provisional Orders and Final Judgments Arising from Securities Law Violations, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 303, 304 (1992). 
62. IOSCO MMOU, supra note 60. 
63. IOSCO MMOU, supra note 60, at app. A (listing current signatories). An additional 
eleven securities authorities have committed to seek legal authority to sign the MMOU. Id. at app. B. A 
2016 “enhanced” IOSCO MMOU had five signatories as of June 2018. See Enhanced Multilateral 
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of 
Information, INT’L SEC. ORG. COMMISSIONS, https://www.iosco.org/about/pdf/Text-of-the-EMMoU.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AWE2-TVLG]; Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Annual 
Conference Focuses on Key Challenges Facing Securities Regulators (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS497.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK7P-CSXS] (listing as 
signatories of the enhanced MMOU the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the British 
Columbia Securities Commission, Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission, the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore, and the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority). 
64. SEC, FY 2017 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, 128 (2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy17congbudgjust.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXY4-2MFL]. 
65. NASAA 2017 Enforcement Report Based on 2016 Data, supra note 35, at 1 (describing the 
organization). 
66. NASAA 2016 Enforcement Report Based on 2015 Data, N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS’N 11 
(Sept. 2017), https://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2016-Enforcement-Report-Based-on-
2015-Data_online.pdf [https://perma.cc/UUX2-5AHM]. 
67. Id. at 5 (reporting 571 incoming referrals for U.S. state securities regulators and 569 
outgoing referrals in 2016); see also NASAA Enforcement Report 2015 Report on 2014 Data, N. AM. 
SECS. ADMIN’RS ASS’N 4 (Sept. 2015), http://nasaa.cdn.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/2015-Enforcement-Report-on-2014-Data_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2PM-
NRST] (reporting 584 outgoing referrals to “sister agencies” and 624 incoming referrals in 2014). 
68. See SEC & N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
REGARDING THE TREATMENT OF NON-PUBLIC INFORMATION SHARED BETWEEN THE NORTH AMERICAN 
SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION AND THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (2017) 






These centralized arrangements are accompanied by bilateral agreements 
signed by single entities. Since 1982, the SEC has signed bilateral MOUs on 
enforcement cooperation with authorities from twenty jurisdictions.69 The SEC 
has also entered into MOUs with various federal agencies and other 
organizations.70 
MOUs are not the exclusive means of formal coordination by the SEC. 
International coordination also takes place through formally documented 
“dialogues,” agreements that provide for meetings and good intentions.71 Some 
of these have the enforcement aim of “[i]mprov[ing] cooperation and the 
exchange of information in cross-border securities enforcement matters.”72 
Some domestic MOUs also provide for regular meetings, “periodic meetings,” 
or reports.73 
Other types of semiformal arrangements include working groups and task 
forces. A few examples—each with its own configuration and origin story—are 
the Enron Task Force, an interagency group formed in response to the collapse 
of Enron;74 the Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) Working 
Group;75 and the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets.76 
 
69. Cooperative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators, supra note 52. Most of the bilateral 
MOUs predate the IOSCO MMOU or go beyond what the IOSCO agreement provides. Id. The SEC 
also lists Communiqués or Joint Statements with Costa Rica, the European Commission, South Africa, 
and Sweden. Id. The SEC’s international MOUs are listed in Appendix A below. 
70. Enforcement MOUs the SEC has entered with domestic U.S. entities are collected in 
Appendix B infra. 
71. Cooperative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators, supra note 52. 
72. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEBI Announce Increased Cooperation and Collaboration 
of Capacity Building Events in India (Jan. 8, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-3.htm 
[https://perma.cc/M8NX-XBCB]. 
73. SEC & CTFC, MOU BETWEEN THE SEC AND CFTC REGARDING COORDINATION IN 
AREAS OF COMMON REGULATORY INTEREST AND INFORMATION SHARING art. II(4) (2018) [hereinafter 
SEC & CFTC INFORMATION SHARING MOU], https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-
07/CFTC_MOU_InformationSharing062818.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GP3-47KY] (“It is anticipated that 
cooperation will be achieved primarily through ongoing, informal, oral consultations, as well as periodic 
meetings, written requests as needed, and other practical arrangements as may be developed by the 
Parties.”); Press Release, SEC & Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, SEC and FinCEN Sign Information 
Sharing Agreement (Dec. 21, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-217.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9EUN-B9PK]. 
74. History: Famous Cases and Criminals: Enron, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION (2019), 
https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/enron [https://perma.cc/UX9X-KS73] (“The sheer magnitude 
of the case prompted creation of the multi-agency Enron Task Force, a unique blend of investigators and 
analysts from the FBI, the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation Division, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and prosecutors from the Department of Justice.”). 
75. See Press Release, DOJ, Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) Working Group 
Announces New Resources to Investigate RMBS Misconduct (May 24, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/residential-mortgage-backed-securities-rmbs-working-group-announces-
new-resources-investigate [https://perma.cc/4CKF-MLDG]. 
76. Created by Executive Order 12,631, 53 Fed. Reg. 9421 (Mar. 18, 1988). See Executive 
Orders, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Aug. 15, 2016) https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12631.html [https://perma.cc/5EXG-5LHK]. 
  




Information sharing is a key component of MOUs and other formal 
arrangements relating to enforcement, which both provide for information 
sharing and include details about the need to keep nonpublic information 
confidential. Statutes and rules may also govern the sharing of information 
among agencies. For example, section 24(c) of the Exchange Act and SEC 
Rule 24c-1 permit the SEC to allow access to nonpublic information “in its 
discretion and upon a showing that such information is needed,” and with 
“assurances of confidentiality.”77 Access can be given only to certain types of 
entities. These include “federal, state, local or foreign government[s] or any 
political subdivision, authority, agency or instrumentality of such government,” 
Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs), and “foreign financial regulatory 
authorit[ies].”78 
The agencies coordinating with the SEC may also have statutes that 
regulate or restrict information sharing. One domestic example is the statutory 
limitation on the ability of the Internal Revenue Service to share certain 
information with other agencies.79 
Information sharing is also central to many of the SEC’s MOUs in the 
enforcement area.80 Signatories to the IOSCO MMOU—including the SEC—
must “make all reasonable efforts to provide . . . the other Authorities with any 
information that it considers is likely to be of assistance to those other 
Authorities . . . .”81 The 2017 MOU between the SEC and NASAA governs the 
sharing of nonpublic information.82 And enforcement MOUs between the SEC 
and the CFTC or the Department of Labor are also primarily about information 
sharing, providing that the agencies intend “to consult, cooperate, exchange 
information, and share data in connection with areas of common regulatory 
interest.”83 Even MOUs that focus primarily on regulation referenced 
 
77. 15 U.S.C § 78x (2018) (“Public Availability of Information”); 17 C.F.R. § 240.24c-1 
(2019). 
78. 17 C.F.R. § 240.24c-1(1)-(3) (2019). 
79. 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2018) (restricting the sharing of tax returns and return information, even 
among government agencies and other authorities); see also IRS & SEC, MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AND THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION FOR TAX EXEMPT BONDS/MUNICIPAL SECURITIES COMPLIANCE (2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/info/municipal/sec-irs-mou030210.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2H8-EQ8J]. 
80. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 33; Eduard H. Cadmus, Note, Revisiting the SEC’s 
Memoranda of Understanding: A Fresh Look, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1800 (2011) (evaluating how 
MOUs can help the SEC successfully get confidential files from foreign institutions). 
81. See IOSCO MMOU, supra note 61, at app. A. 
82. SEC & NASAA MOU, supra note 68 (“This MOU sets forth the understanding of the 
Parties with respect to the treatment of non-public information . . . when the Parties elect to share . . . 
non-public information regarding their observations of, or discussions about, existing, new and amended 
exemptions and related requirements.”); Press Release, SEC, NASAA Sign Info-Sharing Agreement for 
Crowdfunding and Other Offerings (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-
50.html [https://perma.cc/BF4J-44CJ]. 
83. See SEC & CFTC INFORMATION SHARING MOU, supra note 74, art. II(4).; Press Release, 





information sharing. For example, the language in the MOU between the SEC 
and the Federal Reserve identifies broad enforcement goals, including the 
entities’ “ongoing practice of sharing information between their enforcement 
functions.”84 
C. Intertwined Domestic and International Coordination 
Domestic and international coordination should not be viewed in 
isolation, but are part of an intertwined domestic and international network. 
This mix is reflected in part by the list of international MOUs, in which several 
have both domestic and international signatories.85 In particular, several of the 
international MOUs included the SEC, CFTC, and an international entity or 
entities. This was the case for agreements with Jersey financial market 
regulators,86 a 2002 statement of intent signed with Japanese regulators,87 a 
2000 MOU with Singapore,88 and agreements with the United Kingdom.89 
 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-114 [https://perma.cc/QC2E-D5C7]; see also SEC & 
DEP’T OF LABOR, MOU CONCERNING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. SEC AND THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/sec-dol-mou-072913.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UQ6T-3CYQ] (providing for information sharing, geared towards the overlapping 
interest in retirement and investments); SEC & CFTC, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN 
THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (“SEC”) AND THE U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES 
TRADING COMMISSION (“CFTC”) REGARDING THE OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY FUTURES PRODUCT 
TRADING AND THE SHARING OF SECURITY FUTURES PRODUCT INFORMATION (2004) (“[T]he Parties will 
share all trading data as well as related (non-public) information within their possession or control with 
respect to trading activity in securities futures products (SFPs) in connection with surveillance activities 
and enforcement inquiries and investigations upon written request.”). 
84. SEC & BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, MOU BETWEEN THE U.S. SEC AND 
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM REGARDING COORDINATION AND 
INFORMATION SHARING IN AREAS OF COMMON REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY INTEREST (2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-134_mou.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KEV-QE3E] (indicating 
that “[t]he Commission and the Federal Reserve intend to continue their ongoing practice of sharing 
information between their enforcement functions,” although also noting that “issues raised by this 
information” are addressed first by “supervisory tools” and only by enforcement if these tools are 
“inadequate or ineffective”). 
85. See infra app. A. 
86. SEC ET AL., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING COOPERATION, 
CONSULTATION AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (2002), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/jersey.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5BP-9XCU]; Press 
Release, SEC, SEC, CFTC, and Jersey Financial Services Commission Sign MOU Information Sharing 
Arrangement (May 30, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-76.htm [https://perma.cc/7K3N-
DBQ6]. 
87. SEC & SEC. BUREAU OF THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FIN., UNDERSTANDING ON THE 
SHARING OF INFORMATION (1986), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/japan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6FXY-W2ZQ]. 
88. SEC & MONETARY AUTH. OF SING., CONCERNING CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION 
AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (2000), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/singapore.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2TV-YHR2]. 
89. MOU BETWEEN THE SEC/CFTC AND THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY OF 
THE U.K. ON EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (Sept. 23, 1986), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/ukingdom_enfcoop.pdf [https://perma.cc/3F54-
KCQG]; MOU BETWEEN THE SEC/CFTC AND THE U.K. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY AND 
THE SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND THE EXCHANGE OF 
INFORMATION (Sept. 25, 1991), 
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Other non-U.S. securities regulators entered into separate MOUs with the SEC 
and CFTC, but the agreements were negotiated and signed at the same time.90 
Similarly, subject-focused task forces combined federal and state 
regulators. The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, for example, 
included more than twenty-five federal and state agencies and regulators.91 The 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) Working Group is another 
model, including criminal and civil authorities at both state and federal levels.92 
* * * * * 
In sum, the structure of the SEC’s formal coordination supports the view 
of enforcement as the activity of a network, rather than a single agency in 
isolation. It is concerned with both international and domestic interactions. It 
also gives context to the study of the SEC’s acknowledgments, laying the 
groundwork for assessing the extent to which the acknowledgments should be 
viewed as supporting more formalized agreements and the extent to which 
acknowledgments capture additional, ad hoc, coordination. 
III. Constructing the SEC’s Acknowledgment Network 
One of the challenges of studying this area is developing a picture that 
does not overemphasize formal relationships. An understanding of agency 
enforcement that focuses exclusively on statutory or regulatory structure and 
MOUs risks capturing only formal coordination. But both the formal and 
informal are key. Indeed, the SEC’s MOUs contemplate the coexistence of 





90. See, e.g., Press Release, CFTC, The CFTC, SEC and SFC of Hong Kong Sign MOU (Oct. 
5, 1995), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press95/opa3866-95.htm [https://perma.cc/K5HU-
7J8R]. 
91. Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 Fed. Reg. 60,123 (Nov. 17, 2009). But see Rod Rosenstein, 
Deputy Att’y Gen., Morning Keynote Address at the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (Oct. 25, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-morning-
keynote-address-us-chamber-institute [https://perma.cc/3B7L-ZSSP] (indicating that the DOJ was 
“reviewing the mandate of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to evaluate whether it continues 
to meet current needs”). 
92. See, e.g., Press Release, DOJ, Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) Working 
Group Announces New Resources to Investigate RMBS Misconduct (May 24, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/residential-mortgage-backed-securities-rmbs-working-group-announces-
new-resources-investigate [https://perma.cc/W6G2-5HG6] (describing the RMBS Working Group as “a 
collaborative effort led by five co-chairs including Assistant Attorney General for the [DOJ] Criminal 
Division . . . , Acting Assistant Attorney General for the [DOJ] Civil Division . . . , U.S. Attorney for the 
District of Colorado . . . , Director of Enforcement for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) . . . , and New York State Attorney General”); Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Royal Bank 
of Scotland Subsidiary with Misleading Investors in Subprime Rmbs Offering, 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2013/lr22866.htm [https://perma.cc/677Z-ZQ95] (thanking the 
“federal-state” RMBS Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Working Group). 
93. See SEC & CFTC, supra note 73, art. II(4) (“[T]he Parties encourage their respective staffs 





Information about informal cooperation between agencies and other 
entities, particularly in the context of enforcement actions, is sometimes 
difficult to capture. Enforcement and investigation, in general, can be a black 
box; most enforcement activity takes place outside of the public view. 
This Part proposes an approach to developing a more complete picture of 
an enforcement network. This approach takes advantage of one feature of the 
SEC’s enforcement practices. In addition to the more formal agreements 
discussed above,94 the SEC acknowledges the assistance of other organizations 
in public announcements of its enforcement actions. The text of litigation and 
press releases often closes with an acknowledgment of coordination: “The SEC 
appreciates the assistance of . . .” or “thanks the following agencies for their 
cooperation and assistance . . . .” 
An SEC acknowledgment network can be constructed from these releases, 
providing useful information about the SEC’s enforcement network as a whole. 
Although this approach has limitations, described in more detail below, 
tracking these acknowledgments and using them to construct a network 
provides a nuanced description of enforcement interactions that may otherwise 
be invisible to the public eye. 
A. Methodology 
1. Dataset: SEC Litigation and Press Releases 
The SEC routinely issues public releases—litigation and press releases—
announcing and briefly describing the enforcement actions it has taken.95 
According to the SEC, one of the functions of these releases is to give “public 
notice of the institution and disposition of an administrative, civil, or criminal 
proceeding brought under the Federal securities laws or related statutes.”96 
Sources support the notion that issuing these releases is a routine part of the 
SEC’s practices. For instance, former SEC commissioner, Harvey Pitt, has 
 
operations of the Parties. The Parties intend to continue their ongoing practice of sharing information 
between their enforcement divisions, pursuant to customary access requests and grants, and nothing in 
this MOU is intended to modify or replace such sharing, agreements, or the current practices of the 
Parties governing and permitting the use of such enforcement referral information by a Receiving 
Party.”). 
94. See supra Part II. 
95. Links to litigation and press releases are publicly available on the SEC’s website. See 
Litigation Releases, SEC (Sept. 20, 2019) https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/HA7A-4FJW]; Press Releases, SEC (Sept. 19, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressreleases [https://perma.cc/8N58-JJ9G]. 
96. Privacy Act Issuances, SEC (2003), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PAI-2003-
SEC/html/PAI-2003-SEC.html [https://perma.cc/3BMF-SRD4]; see also Administrative and Litigation 
Release System, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/privacy/sorn/secsorn33.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R9X-
YPJZ]; see also id. (describing the SEC’s litigation and press releases as “[r]ecords . . . maintained on 
persons who have been named as respondents or defendants in administrative, civil or criminal 
proceedings involving allegations of violations of the Federal securities laws or related statutes”). 
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written that a litigation release is issued “every time the agency takes or 
commences formal enforcement action.”97 
SEC litigation releases report activity relating to the SEC’s civil suits in 
federal court.98 In many instances, SEC enforcement actions are settled at the 
same time a complaint is filed,99 leading to a single litigation release reporting 
the filing and resolution. Litigation releases might also report other types of 
action within the judicial process: the agency may issue a litigation release if it 
requests an asset freeze, files a complaint, amends a complaint, settles an 
action, gets court approval of a settlement, distributes funds to investors, etc. 
SEC press releases, according to the agency’s website, are “[o]fficial 
announcements highlighting recent actions taken by the SEC and other 
newsworthy information.”100 In other words, they are essentially what one 
would expect a press release to be, although note the use of the phrase “official 
announcements.” This study captures only press releases that both report 
enforcement activity and acknowledge assistance. But the subject matter of 
SEC press releases varies wildly, including enforcement actions, but also the 
comings and goings of SEC officials, roundtables and presentations, creation of 
committees, rulemaking and requests for comments, agency response to world 
events, and other varied topics.101 
Having two sources of acknowledgments—litigation and press releases—
presents challenges for studying underlying enforcement interactions, which 
are discussed more in the next Section. Including both litigation and press 
releases is important, however, for understanding the SEC’s enforcement 
program overall. The SEC can bring an enforcement action in federal court or 
 
97. See THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 50, at 272 (“The initiation of an 
SEC injunctive action, even if settled at the same time, is always publicly disseminated by an SEC 
litigation release (and sometimes a press release as well).”); Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, 
Securities Regulation By Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE. J. ON REG. 149, 185 
(1990). 
98. Litigation Releases, supra note 95 (describing litigation releases as “concerning civil 
lawsuits brought by the Commission in federal court”). 
99. See Stephen Choi et al., SEC Enforcement Activity Against Public Companies and Their 
Subsidiaries: Fiscal Year 2016 Update, CORNERSTONE RES. 7 (2016), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-Against-Public-
Company-Defendants-2016 [https://perma.cc/HCV6-MT78]. 
100. Press Releases, supra note 95. 
101. Id. A few examples convey the flavor of this mix of press release subjects. See Press 
Release, SEC, SEC Announces Agenda and Panelists for the 37th Annual Small Business Forum (Dec. 
7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-274 [https://perma.cc/9CP4-U29P]; Press 
Release, SEC, SEC Halts Alleged Insider Trading Ring Spanning Three Countries (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-273 [https://perma.cc/CNB4-PPUR]; Press Release, SEC, 
SEC Investor Advisory Committee to Meet on December 13 (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-272 [https://perma.cc/FQ9U-5QLE]; Press Release, SEC, 
SEC Names Danae M. Serrano Acting Ethics Counsel and Designated Agency Ethics Official (Dec. 11, 
2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-278 [https://perma.cc/6ZJ8-QXQW]; Press 
Release, SEC, Shira Pavis Minton, Ethics Counsel, to Retire From SEC After 20 Years of Federal 
Service (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-271 [https://perma.cc/L7EF-
7S6A]; Press Release, SEC, Three Developers Settle Charges of Fraudulent EB-5 Offering  (Dec. 12, 





can institute an administrative action before an administrative law judge (ALJ). 
The balance between the two venues has shifted over time as the availability of 
remedies and the ability to reach targets in administrative actions has 
expanded.102 Successful challenges to the SEC’s use of ALJs have also forced 
adjustments in where the SEC brings its actions.103 For this project, the key 
point is that the litigation releases do not report actions brought by the SEC in 
an administrative forum. To capture such administrative enforcement actions, a 
study must include press releases. Not every administrative action is reported in 
a press release, but if an administrative action results in an acknowledgment of 
assistance, the press release is the place to find it. 
Public documents about the SEC’s practices (such as the SEC 
Enforcement Manual) do not include guidance about whom to acknowledge or 
when an acknowledgment should be made. Some anecdotal evidence, however, 
suggests that the practice is longstanding. A litigation release from 1973, for 
instance, concluded with: “Mr. Moran [for the SEC] acknowledges the 
cooperation and assistance rendered . . . by Ms. Bess Myerson’s office of the 
New York City Department of Consumer Affairs.”104 
2. Construction of the Network 
To construct the network, SEC litigation releases and press releases on the 
SEC website were scraped.105 The acknowledgment sentences were extracted 
using a series of grammar rules, which looked for the subject (“SEC” and 
“Commission”) and verb (“thank,” “appreciate,” “acknowledge,” and 
variations). This Article reports results from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 
2018, organized by calendar year.106 
The structure of the releases and the language of the acknowledgments 
were quite standardized.107 The acknowledged entities, however, varied widely. 
The acknowledgments also often used different names, abbreviations, or 
phrasing to refer to the same entity. For example, “U.S. Attorney’s Office” 
could alternatively be listed as “USAO.” Other names were long (e.g., 
 
102. Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Biased? An Empirical 
Investigation, 92 WASH. L. REV. 315, 317 (2017). 
103. Id. 
104. See SEC Litig. Rel. No. 5810, 1 SEC Docket 9, 21 (Mar. 26, 1973); see also SEC Litig. 
Rel. No. 5812 (Mar. 26, 1973) (noting that “[t]he National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. of 
New York City assisted the Commission in its investigation leading to the filing of its Complaint . . . .”). 
105. The description of the SEC Acknowledgment Entity Recognition draws on information 
provided by Chaoyun Chen, who wrote the underlying program. 
106. The starting date is not inherent to the program; the constraint derives from the 
information published on the SEC’s webpage. The webpage was established in September 1995. The 
first year for which the SEC’s website provides a full set of litigation releases is 1996 and the first full 
set of press releases is 1998. 
107. A sample of litigation releases from 1995 to June 2018 (every tenth litigation release) 
was manually reviewed to identify the language used by the SEC to acknowledge the assistance of other 
entities. 
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“Massachusetts Secretary of State William Francis Galvin’s Securities 
Division”), quite rare (e.g., “Barnstable County District Attorney Office”), or 
varied in whether they listed a subdivision (e.g., Division of Securities).108 An 
entity dictionary helped the program identify the most common examples as 
the same entity.109 Manual review was used to correct other entity names that 
had been incorrectly parsed.110 
The resulting report indexed the acknowledged entities for the user input 
date range, identifying each entity and the number of times they were thanked. 
The report also indicated the release in which they were thanked.111 
As a validity check, SEC litigation releases from the SEC’s 2015 fiscal 
year (October 1, 2014, to September 30, 2015) were coded by hand.112 A 
search for acknowledgment language identified the body of entities that were 
thanked. The names of the acknowledged entities were manually extracted and 
indexed and compared to the results of the automated process. The manual 
review and automated program identified the same litigation releases that 
contained acknowledgments for the October 1, 2014 to September 30, 2015 
period.113 
The study of acknowledgments in public releases has some inherent 
limitations. These limitations are particularly important to keep in mind when 
connecting the SEC’s practice of acknowledging assistance—the 
acknowledgment network—to the underlying enforcement interactions with 
other agencies and entities. 
 
108. Other variations included how the names were punctuated, or typos in the original text. 
109. For example, all variants of the United States Attorney’s Office (“U.S. Attorney’s 
Office” etc.) are normalized to USAO for the program to recognize them, then ultimately changed back 
to “U.S. Attorney’s Office.” 
110. The program’s first output was in the form of excel sheets listing the litigation releases, 
showing the extracted text, and showing the extracted entity names. These files were manually reviewed 
and corrected. A separate analysis batch file was run to convert validated files to final output files. 
111. Some of the releases also acknowledged or named internal SEC divisions or particular 
people, which are outside the scope of this Article. Searches and automated acknowledgment indexing 
also occasionally identified acknowledgments of the cooperation of target corporations. These are not 
included in the reported results. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Nortel Networks Pays $35 Million to 
Settle Financial Fraud Charges (Oct. 15, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-217.htm 
[https://perma.cc/C6V9-7AEL] (“In settling the matter, the Commission acknowledges Nortel’s 
substantial remedial efforts and cooperation); Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Two Former Finance 
Executives of Newpark Resources, Inc., and Principal of Key Newpark Vendor in Fraudulent 
Accounting Scheme (July 16, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21137.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WZF8-GFEB] (“The Commission acknowledges the cooperation of Newpark in its 
investigation.”). 
112. SEC litigation releases issued between October 1, 2014, and September 30, 2015, were 
searched for the use of the terms “assistance or thank or appreciate or acknowledge” including word 
variations. The search was conducted on Bloomberg Law in the SEC Litigation Releases database. SEC 
press releases were also manually searched and reviewed for 1996-2017. The SEC press releases were 
searched in Bloomberg Law using these terms: “thanks OR thank OR appreciate OR appreciates OR 
appreciation OR assistance OR acknowledge OR acknowledges.” 
113. The manual review identified a draft as well as an amended version, but later eliminated 
this because it was a duplicate. The manual review and automated program also identified the same total 





The SEC’s issue of acknowledgments is routinized and fairly 
standardized.114 However, the study of the SEC’s acknowledgment practices, 
like the citation and acknowledgment network studies on which this is 
modeled, is not necessarily a comprehensive account of underlying 
enforcement activity, and may pick up changes in acknowledgment practices as 
well as changes in the underlying interagency interactions. By definition, for 
instance, it does not include unacknowledged coordination115 or enforcement 
activity that does not result in a public release.116 
Other caveats about the relationship between the acknowledgments and 
the underlying enforcement activity stem from the study’s reliance on litigation 
and press releases. In particular, there is not necessarily a one-to-one 
correspondence between a public release and an enforcement action.117 
The SEC may issue multiple releases referring to the same conduct and 
target in different stages of the enforcement process. For instance, the agency 
may issue a release when a complaint is filed and a separate release when a 
matter is resolved.118 The same conduct may involve multiple targets or 
defendants, sometimes resulting in multiple releases about the different 
individuals or entities. Finally, in some instances, even an SEC action for the 
same underlying misconduct, same target, and at the same stage of enforcement 
can lead to the issuing of both a press release and a litigation release in the 
 
114. See, e.g., THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 50, at 272. 
115. See infra Section III.B.1. 
116. One example of enforcement coordination that might not lead to a release is when the 
SEC refers a matter entirely to another agency or entity. Evaluating the effect of referrals on results is 
difficult, however. Examples exist where the SEC reports another agency’s action in its public releases, 
even when the SEC has not completed an action. See, e.g., Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Brings 
Enforcement Actions Against Three Individuals, Goldman Sachs, and Massachusetts Financial Services 
Company Related to Trading Based on Non-Public Information About the Treasury’s Decision to Cease 
Issuance of the 30-Year Bond (Sept. 4, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18322.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2BTY-BPH4] (“The Commission has investigated this matter—which remains open—
in coordination with, and acknowledges the cooperation and assistance of, the United States Attorney’s 
Office for the Southern District of New York, which has entered into a plea agreement with [one target] 
and obtained the indictment of [another target].”). 
Some commentators have also suggested that SEC releases underrepresent SEC defeats. See Russell G. 
Ryan, Get the SEC Out of the PR Business, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/russell-g-ryan-get-the-sec-out-of-the-pr-business-1417386821 
[https://perma.cc/3VMU-WNFD]; Russell G. Ryan, Mum’s the Word about 
SEC Defeats, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324659404
578504842305831564 [https://perma.cc/4389-BSF7]. Even an action that ultimately results in a defeat 
may appear in the data, however, because when an associated release reports the filing of the action; the 
agency does not know the outcome at that early stage. 
117. What counts as a single enforcement action can itself have tricky boundaries. Counting 
problems are common to any empirical study of SEC enforcement. What counts as a single enforcement 
action? Should the number of targets be reported? Should all actions coming out of an underlying event 
be grouped together into a single matter? Cf. Verity Winship & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, An Empirical 
Study of Admissions in SEC Settlements, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2018) (noting the differing results 
of counts based on separate settlements with the SEC and those based on matters “related [to] actions 
for the same underlying conduct”). 
118. Administrative and Litigation Release System, supra note 96 (pointing out that releases 
provide notice of the “institution and disposition” of enforcement actions). 
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same press-worthy action.119 In each of these categories, the releases may 
contain acknowledgments.120 
The links in the SEC’s acknowledgment network thus differ from those in 
the academic or scientific acknowledgment studies where each article appears 
once. The analogy to studies of citation networks might be closer if the body of 
articles studied included multiple drafts and final versions. 
Nonetheless, for several reasons, variations in how enforcement actions 
are announced likely have limited effect on the numbers of acknowledgments 
and releases. Most enforcement actions are settled at the same time they are 
filed,121 which minimizes the concern that multiple releases were issued at 
different stages of a matter. Moreover, the results indicate that about half of the 
entities were acknowledged only once in the study’s timeframe.122 Because 
they were thanked in only a single release, these players—the majority—
cannot have received multiple, duplicate acknowledgments for the same 
underlying enforcement action. 
In general, the article reports the acknowledgment network, including all 
SEC litigation and press releases for the time period studied. However, 
adjusted numbers are also reported where it is helpful to illustrate the 
connection between the acknowledgment network and underlying enforcement 
interactions. The adjusted numbers exclude press releases that report 
enforcement activity against the same target within the same calendar year as a 
 
119. THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 50, at 272 (“The initiation of an 
SEC injunctive action, even if settled at the same time, is always publicly disseminated by an SEC 
litigation release (and sometimes a press release as well).”); see, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges 
Three Sales Managers with Insider Trading Ahead of Major Acquisition (May 12, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-94 [https://perma.cc/ZEQ6-XAVQ]. 
120. Sometimes acknowledgments are repeated in releases from different procedural stages, 
but sometimes some of the stages will be announced without acknowledgments. Compare Litigation 
Release, SEC, In WorldCom Case SEC Files Proposed Settlement of Claim for Civil Penalty (May 19, 
2003), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18147.htm [https://perma.cc/N6KN-P5JR] 
(announcing proposed WorldCom settlement with acknowledgements), Litigation Release, SEC, In 
WorldCom Case SEC Files a Supplement to the Proposed Settlement of  Its Claim for a Civil Penalty 
(July 2, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18210.htm [https://perma.cc/7RMA-9K5V] 
(announcing modification of proposed WorldCom settlement with same acknowledgements), and 
Litigation Release, SEC, The Honorable Jed Rakoff Approves Settlement of the SEC’s Claim for a Civil 
Penalty Against WorldCom (July 7, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18219.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VZR9-RPSE] (announcing judicial approval of WorldCom settlement with same 
acknowledgements), with Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Lawyer and Her Husband in Eb-5 
Fraud (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2018/lr24319.htm 
[https://perma.cc/HT8F-58XR] (announcing the filing of a complaint and acknowledging the assistance 
of the US Citizenship and Immigration Services), and Litigation Release, SEC, Court Enters Final 
Judgments in Eb-5 Scheme, Ordering Return of $25.8 Million to Defrauded Chinese Investors (Dec. 6, 
2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2018/lr24366.htm [https://perma.cc/E6GP-H98U] 
(announcing the settlement of that same complaint, without acknowledgment). 
121. One study found that 97% of actions against public companies were settled at the same 
time they were initiated in FY2016, and that the median was 87% for financial-year 2010 to financial-
year 2015. See Choi, supra note 99. 





litigation release.123 For convenience, this Article refers to these as “same-
target” press releases.124 
Because of these limitations, it makes sense to avoid conflating the 
acknowledgment network with the enforcement network, recognizing the study 
of acknowledgments as a tool that complements other information (including 
the structure of statutes, rules, and MOUs). Together they help map the 
enforcement network as a whole. 
B. Findings 
This section analyzes the nodes, edges, and network characteristics of the 
SEC’s acknowledgment network. These correspond respectively to the 
acknowledged entities; the acknowledgments and the underlying coordination 
that they represent; and the characteristics of these interactions, including the 
changing number of entities acknowledged in any single release. The analysis 
below examines acknowledgments from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 
2018. 
The findings below are reported in terms of three main categories: (1) 
acknowledgments, (2) entities, and (3) releases. “Acknowledgments” refer to 
each time the SEC acknowledges any entity. “Entities” are the agencies and 
other organizations the SEC acknowledges. 
 
123. A mixed automated and manual process was developed to check the name of the target(s) 
announced in each litigation release against the full text of the press releases within the same year. The 
press releases identified through this process (same-target press releases) are excluded from the adjusted 
numbers. 
124. The results suggest that multiple releases for a single enforcement action or matter do not 
amplify the number of acknowledgments of repeat players involved in more complex, high profile, or 
longer lasting matters. See infra Section III.B (reporting a consistent percentage of the actions brought 
by the repeat players, and a consistent identity of the top-ten acknowledged entities with and without the 
same-target press releases). 
A manual full-text review of a small sample of these same-target releases also indicates that sometimes 
the same action resulted in acknowledgments in a press release but none when the action was announced 
in a litigation release (perhaps predictably). Compare Press Release, SEC, David Kreinberg, Former 
CFO of Comverse Technology, Inc., Agrees to Settle SEC Charges in Options Backdating Case (Oct. 
24, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-180.htm [https://perma.cc/875K-RYLD] 
(acknowledging the FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office), with Litigation Release, SEC, David Kreinberg, 
Former CFO of Comverse Technology, Inc., Agrees to Settle SEC Charges in Options Backdating Case 
(Oct. 24, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2006/lr19878.htm [https://perma.cc/E6A7-
GY2G] (announcing the same settlement without acknowledgments). 
But sometimes the opposite was true. For example, in a press release and a litigation release issued on 
the same day, announcing the same SEC action taken against the same target, the press release contained 
no acknowledgments, but the litigation release did. Compare Press Release, SEC, SEC, U.S. Attorney 
Charge Promoters of Real Estate Scheme Targeting African-American Community (May 14, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-88.htm [https://perma.cc/2T26-JFXQ] (announcing a 
complaint filed against Jeanetta M. Standefor and her company, AFG, without acknowledging any 
assistance), with Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Promoters of a Multi-Million Dollar Real Estate 
Scheme Targeting the African-American Community (May 14, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20575.htm [https://perma.cc/38MX-SS3Z] (announcing 
the same compaint, but acknowledging “the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central 
District of California, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the California Department of 
Corporations”). 
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For the purpose of this Article, “releases” or “releases containing 
acknowledgments” are the SEC’s press and litigation releases that contain one 
or more acknowledgments. Findings reported in terms of “all releases” include 
the releases without acknowledgments as well. 
An example illustrates how these are counted. Assume the SEC thanked 
the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office in one litigation release (one release, 
two acknowledgments). Assume, realistically, that the SEC then thanked the 
FBI again in a separate release (one release, one acknowledgment). The totals 
would be two releases and three acknowledgments. Overall, the SEC thanked 
two entities: the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the FBI. 
For the whole time period, 25% of all litigation relases included 
acknowledgments of assistance, but this mean over the full time frame masks 
year-to-year variation, from a low of 8% in 1998 to 44% in 2018. 
Over the full time frame approximately 16% of press releases 
acknowledged assistance. Limited conclusions can be drawn from this low 
percentage, particularly for press releases, because such releases are used to 
announce a wide variety of events.125 In addition to the announcements of 
enforcement actions that are the concern of this study, press releases announce 
hirings and departures of SEC staff and supervisors, agendas for meetings, and 
various announcements related to SEC rulemaking.126 
During the study’s time period, the total number of SEC litigation and 
press releases that contained one or more acknowledgments was 2,959 (2,177 
litigation releases and 782 press releases). The number of acknowledgments 
identified was 6,721 (4,730 in litigation releases and 1,991 in press releases).127 
1. Nodes/Acknowledged Entities 
The list of acknowledged entities is long, and the entities themselves are 
heterogeneous. Over twenty-one years (1998 through 2018), the SEC 
acknowledged approximately 490 unique entities.128 Some formal agency 
 
125. Press Releases, supra note 95 (noting that the SEC issues press releases to “highlight 
recent actions taken by the SEC and other newsworthy information”). 
126. See Administrative and Litigation Release System, supra note 96. 
127. These numbers include same-target press releases. If the same-target press releases are 
excluded, the total number of public releases that contained acknowledgments was 2,526, and the total 
number of acknowledgments was 5,612. See discussion supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text 
(describing methodology). 
128. Closely related names were manually consolidated to eliminate duplicates. The resulting 
total is approximate. For example, it does not take into account agencies whose names or roles were 
changed in the time period reported. It counts separately, for instance the French securities authorities, 
Commission des Opérations de Bourse, and its successor, the Autorité des Marchés Financiers. See 
IOSCO MMOU, supra note 61, at app. A (noting this transition). 
In a few instances the SEC thanked a category—for example, ”foreign authorities”—rather than an 
individual entity. These were counted as one entity and one acknowledgment. See, e.g., Litigation 
Release, SEC, Federal Court Approves Global Research Analyst Settlement (Oct. 31, 2003), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18438.htm [https://perma.cc/N432-TSFX] (acknowledging 





materials refer to inter-agency coordination or coordination specifically among 
securities regulators, as in the case of connections made through IOSCO and 
some MOUs.129 The entities that the SEC acknowledges are, however, much 
more varied on a few dimensions. The SEC thanks state, federal, and 
international entities; big-city U.S. Attorneys’ General Offices; small-town 
police departments; the FBI; self-regulatory organizations (SROs);130 and 
others. 
A clear division emerges from the data, however, between the short list of 
entities that are repeat players and which account for half of the 
acknowledgments over the whole period, and the much longer list of entities 
that are one-shotters or are, at least, acknowledged only a few times over the 
whole period. 
i. Repeat Players 
For the full period (1998-2018), the top-ten entities with the greatest 
number of acknowledgments were the following: 
 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)/National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)/NASD Regulation 
 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 U.S. Postal Inspection Service 
 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)/NYSE Regulation 
 Options Regulatory Surveillance Authority 
 Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
 Ontario Securities Commission & British Columbia Securities 
Commission (tied)131 
The very top of the list—U.S. Attorney’s Offices, the FBI, and FINRA 
entities—together account for approximately half the acknowledgments for the 
time period (51% or 3449/6721).132 The SEC releases included 1,419 
 
Root, Inc. with Foreign Bribery (Sept. 3, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20700.htm [https://perma.cc/N4EA-LWKE] (thanking 
“foreign authorities”). 
129. See supra Part II. 
130. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2018) (defining SROs that 
operate under the supervision of the SEC). 
131. The list is the same if the same-target press releases are excluded, except for minor 
changes at the bottom of the list, where the Ontario Securities Commission has one fewer 
acknowledgment than the British Columbia Securities Commission, tying with the Texas State 
Securities Board. 
132. The percentage is the same if same-target press releases are excluded. Using these 
adjusted numbers, the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the FBI, and FINRA entities taken together account for 
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acknowledgments of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices;133 1,212 acknowledgments of the 
FBI; and 818 combined of FINRA, NASD and NASD Regulation.134 Of the 
2,959 releases containing acknowledgments, 1,044 (35%) acknowledged both 
the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the same release, with 491 of those 
releases acknowledging these two entities only. 
The identification of these entities as repeat players is consistent with the 
SEC’s general description of its coordination. In its 2017 Annual Report, the 
agency noted that the SEC Enforcement Division “primarily collaborates . . . 
with the DOJ, the 94 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, and the FBI.”135 The 2017 
Report does not list FINRA among the other “federal and state agencies” with 
whom it collaborates, but describes elsewhere the “[o]versight of broker-
dealers” as “in many ways a coordinated effort with the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA).”136 A similar relationship holds, presumably, 
for FINRA’s predecessor NASD and the NASD’s wholly owned subsidiary, 
NASD Regulation. 
The U.S. Postal Inspection Service may be the entity on the top-ten list 
that is most overlooked in the literature. Established by Benjamin Franklin, the 
service investigates misuse of the postal system.137 Postal Inspectors are 
“authorized by Congress to enforce nearly 200 federal statutes related to crimes 
involving the U.S. Mail and postal system.”138 It is a law-enforcement agency; 
 
51% (2,877/5,612), with 1,177 acknowledgments of the U.S. Attorney’s Offices, 997 of the FBI, and 
703 of FINRA entities. 
133. Treating the U.S. Attorney’s Offices as a single entity masks some regional distribution. 
The acknowledgment often specifies the particular U.S. Attorney’s Office—for example, thanking the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York or the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
District of Utah. Sometimes a single release acknowledged more than one regional U.S. Attorney’s 
Office. E.g., Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Obtains Emergency Court Orders Halting $88 Million 
Nationwide Prime Bank Scam and Preserving Assets (Apr. 5, 2002), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17459.htm [https://perma.cc/R33Z-E88A] (acknowledging 
the “U.S. Attorney’s Offices in Phoenix and Cincinnati”). This was counted as a single acknowledgment 
of the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, rather than two distinct acknowledgements of each individual office. 
134. These are counted together because FINRA was created in July 2007 as the consolidation 
of NASD and its separate regulatory, enforcement, and arbitration functions. See SEC Rel. No. SR-
NASD-2007-023, Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; 
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to Implement Governance 
and Related Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm Regulatory Functions of 
NASD and NYSE Regulations, Inc. (July 26, 2007). 
135. SEC, 2019 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 32, at 97. The rest of the list of 
collaborators is not as closely tied to the findings over the full period.  In addition to the most frequent 
collaborations, the annual report pointed to coordination with other agencies “including, among others, 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), the Department of Education, the Department of Labor, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
the Internal Revenue Service, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).” Id. 
136. Id. 
137. What We Do, U.S. POSTAL INSPECTION SERV. (2019), 
https://postalinspectors.uspis.gov/aboutus/mission.aspx [https://perma.cc/PS4Z-XACJ]. 






although its 2017 Annual Report has “Connecting With Customers” on the 
contents list, the accompanying photo is a postal inspector pointing a gun.139 
Coordination with other agencies is built into the U.S. Postal Inspection 
Service’s descriptions of its own activities. For example, it formed part of a 
post-Enron Corporate Fraud Task Force created through presidential executive 
order and has worked closely with the DOJ’s Criminal Fraud Section.140 The 
agency has issued publications aimed at helping federal, state, and local law-
enforcement agencies “understand how the Postal Inspection Service can assist 
in . . . investigations.”141 The same publication indicated the service’s interest 
in “sharing its knowledge and experience, intelligence data, resources, and 
personnel,” albeit “within the limits of legal restrictions, staffing, and physical 
distance.”142 
Most of the time—in 150 of 179 acknowledgments (84%)—the U.S. 
Postal Inspectors were acknowledged at the same time as a U.S. Attorney’s 
Office. In other releases, they were acknowledged in conjunction with other 
criminal authorities, such as the DOJ’s Criminal Fraud Division.143 The service 
was acknowledged by itself three times. One example was when a company 
“intentionally delayed the retrieval of mail” so that it could use the next day’s 
price for financial contracts.144 
ii. One-Shotters 
What the big-three or top-ten lists leave out is the prevalence of one-time 
and other infrequent coordination. As noted above, approximately 490 separate 
entities were acknowledged over the reported time period. Approximately 44% 
(216 of 490) of these were acknowledged only once in the whole multi-decade 
time period. The SEC acknowledged approximately 71% (347 of 490) of all 
entities three or fewer times. 
iii. Missing Entities 
As noted above, an inherent limitation of any study of acknowledgments 
is that it does not identify unacknowledged behavior. To test what might be 
missing, a few categories of entities lend themselves to predictions either about 
 




141. A Law Enforcement Guide to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, U.S. POSTAL 
INSPECTION SERV. (Sept. 2006), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=34409 [https://perma.cc/JL9F-3GJK] 
142. Id. 
143. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Gen Re Executive for Aiding in Aig Securities Fraud 
(June 6, 2005) https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-85.htm [https://perma.cc/78ZD-3G28]. 
144. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Nationwide Life Insurance Company with Pricing 
Violations (May 14, 2015) https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-89.html 
[https://perma.cc/VW4D-MPE3]. 
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the related acknowledgment practice or about the underlying coordination. For 
example, one might expect coordination or assistance with no acknowledgment 
when entities are intelligence agencies or are governmental authorities in tax 
havens. In both of these instances one might predict a preference not to be 
acknowledged, or to be acknowledged only generically (e.g., thanks to “several 
foreign law enforcement agencies”145). 
Indeed, no intelligence agencies were identified as receiving 
acknowledgments within the time period. On the other hand, authorities from 
jurisdictions that are considered tax havens do appear in the data.146 Both 
results suggest that the dynamic of thanking and publicity of being 
acknowledged may vary depending on the entity being acknowledged. 
The relationship between the SEC and the CFTC provides another 
opportunity to probe unacknowledged coordination, but again illustrates the 
difficulty of gauging the connection between assistance and acknowledgment 
of assistance. Based on materials outside of this study, one might predict 
coordination, or at least interaction, between the SEC and CFTC. The agencies 
have overlapping mandates,147 sometimes pursue parallel enforcement 
actions,148 and have entered formal information-sharing arrangements.149 On 
the other hand, the relationship between the agencies has sometimes been 
contentious,150 perhaps making it less likely that interaction would be 
 
145. Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Seven in $7 Million, International Pump-and-
Dump Fraud (Feb. 18, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21862.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TXK2-MCJ2]; see also Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Sues Millennium Financial, Ltd. 
for Running an International Boiler Room Operation (May 22, 2002), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17528.htm [https://perma.cc/H3HT-NF63] (acknowledging 
“regulatory and law enforcement officials of several foreign jurisdictions”). 
146. For a list of tax havens see Evolution of the EU List of Tax Havens, EUR. COMMISSION 
(Mar. 12, 2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/eu_list_update_12_03_2019_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DXQ9-XA58]; see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Pump-and-Dump in Marley 
Coffee Stock (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-259.html 
[https://perma.cc/G7JT-RTXP] (thanking the Republic of the Marshall Islands Banking Commission, 
among others); Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Obtains Temporary Restraining Order and Asset Freeze of 
Imperia Invest IBC Relating To Internet Based Offering Fraud (Oct. 7, 2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21686.htm [https://perma.cc/TCP7-5996] (thanking the 
Vanuatu Financial Services Commission, among others); Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Solicitor in 
Investment Scheme Targeting Deaf Community (Sept. 9, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-181.htm [https://perma.cc/D7JY-X5GT] (same); Press 
Release, SEC, SEC Halts Web-Based Scheme Defrauding Deaf Investors (Oct. 7, 2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-184.htm [https://perma.cc/AP2Z-5TDN] (same). 
147. See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (jurisdiction of the CFTC); 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2018) (jurisdiction 
of the SEC). 
148. See Press Release, CFTC, supra note 29; Litigation Release, SEC, Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Ronald Stephen Holt, et al.  (Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Litigation 
Release No. 18356], https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18356.htm [https://perma.cc/L9HH-
N3HH]; Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Unregistered Investment Adviser for Defrauding Clients 
in Several States (Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter SEC Litigation Release No. 21464], 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21464.htm [https://perma.cc/CX48-XYE5]. 
149. See infra Appendix B. 





acknowledged. The SEC acknowledged the CFTC 104 times over the study’s 
period. Was the CFTC over- or underthanked for the amount of coordination? 
Without having other information about how often the agency provided 
assistance, it is difficult to gauge the connection between assistance and 
acknowledgment of assistance. 
iv. Mix of Entity Types 
The entities were categorized into federal, private (especially SROs such 
as FINRA and the stock exchanges), state and local, and international (non-
U.S.). None of these categories is limited to securities regulators; they also 
include other government authorities and SROs. 
When all acknowledgments are included (including the dominant three 
repeat players), 55% of the acknowledgments are of federal entities, 18% are of 
private entities, 12% are of state and local entities, 14% are of international 
entities, and 0.5% acknowledge other entity types. 
If the dominant repeat players—U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the FBI, and 
FINRA entities—are excluded, the remaining acknowledgments are fairly 
evenly distributed among entity types. Excluding the top-three repeat players, 
the SEC acknowledged federal entities in 32% (1,063 of 3,272) of the 
remaining acknowledgments, private entities in 13% (424 of 3,272), state and 
local entities in 25% (824 of 3,272), international in another 28% (925 of 
3,272), and miscellaneous others for the remainder. 
Examination of the list of entities that were acknowledged, without regard 
to the number of acknowledgments per entity, reveals a long list of U.S. state 
and local entities and an almost equally long list of international ones. These 
two entity types accounted for 42% (206 of 490) and 37% (181 of 490), 
respectively, of the total number of unique entities. In contrast, federal entities 
accounted for 13% of the entities (62 of 490), private entities for 3% (16 of 
490), and other types for 5% (25 of 490). These findings are summarized in 
Table 1 below. 
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Acknowledgments Number of Entities 
U.S. Federal 3690151 (55% of total) 62 (13% of total) 
U.S. Private  
(e.g., SROs, Exchanges) 
1242152 (18% of total) 16 (3% of total) 
U.S. State and Local 824 (12% of total) 206 (42% of total) 
International 925 (14% of total) 181 (37% of total) 
Other 40 (1% of total) 25 (5% of total) 
TOTALS 6721 490 
 
Taken together, this categorization of acknowledgement by entity type 
suggests two main points. First, it reflects parity between international and 
domestic state and local entities, both in percentage of acknowledgments and in 
the number of different entities thanked at least once in the time period. 
Second, it suggests that the SEC’s acknowledgments of federal entities 
dominate the number of acknowledgments, but are concentrated in fewer 
separate entities. These findings are consistent with the predominance of 
federal entities on the top-ten list and the presence of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
and the FBI (both in the U.S. federal category) on the list of the top-three 
dominant repeat players. 
v. U.S. State and Local Entities 
The SEC acknowledged entities from forty-nine U.S. states, as well as 
Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, NASAA (the member organization for 
state securities regulators), and local police departments or other local 
authorities. 
The states with the top total number of acknowledgments during the 
whole period were New York and Texas, with Massachusetts and Florida tied 
for third.153 At the entity level, the top-three state and local entities were the 
Texas State Securities Board, New York State Attorney General’s Office, and 
the Massachusetts Secretary of State, Securities Division. These three entities 
accounted for 20% (165 of 824) of the total acknowledgments of state and local 
entities. 
 
151. This figure includes 1,419 acknowledgments of a U.S. Attorney’s Office and 1,212 of the 
FBI. 
152. This figure includes 818 acknowledgments of FINRA and its predecessors, NASD and 
NASDR. 





Texas provides an example of the variety of acknowledged entities. When 
the SEC acknowledged an entity from Texas, most of the time it was the Texas 
State Securities Board. (These acknowledgments were not concentrated around 
a single time period.) The rest of the acknowledgments, however, were of 
varied state and local entities, including the Texas Attorney General, the Dallas 
Police Department, the Harris County District Attorney’s Office, the Texas 
Departments of Insurance and of Public Safety, the Texas Lottery Commission, 
the Railroad Commission of Texas, and the Texas Rangers. 
vi. International Entities 
The SEC acknowledged entities from seventy-seven different 
international jurisdictions.154 The jurisdictions with the top three total number 
of acknowledgments during the whole period were Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and Switzerland.155 The three entities with the largest number of 
acknowledgments during the whole period were the Ontario Securities 
Commission, British Columbia Securities Commission, and the U.K. Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) /U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). Two 
Canadian securities regulators—the Ontario Securities Commission and the 
British Columbia Securities Commission—had a relatively high number of 
acknowledgments when compared to domestic entities as well.156 
In the international context, a pattern emerges where a few entities and 
jurisdictions garnered the majority of the acknowledgments, while many 
entities and jurisdictions were one-shotters. More than one fourth of all the 
acknowledgments of international entities were of the top three (Ontario 
Securities Commission, British Columbia Securities Commission, and the 
U.K’s FSA/FCA).157 
In contrast, most of the jurisdictions (77% or 59 of 77) were 
acknowledged ten or fewer times during the time period.158 At the entity level, 
41% (75 of 181) of the international entities were acknowledged only once. 
The type of international entity varied. The SEC often acknowledged 
securities regulators from other countries. The releases acknowledged, for 
instance, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and 
 
154. The term “jurisdictions” is used here because the list includes countries (Australia, 
Brazil, Japan, Vanuatu, etc.), but also includes jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands, the Turks and 
Caicos Islands, and the Isle of Man, some of which are British Overseas Territories. It also includes 
acknowledgments that referred to the region or continent (“Europe,” “foreign authorities in Asia”) rather 
than a particular nation or entity. 
155. This total is organized by jurisdiction rather than entity. It includes acknowledgments of 
all entities within the jurisdiction. 
156. See the top-ten list supra in Section III.2.B.1.i. 
157. The top-three international entities were acknowledged in 26% (240 of 925) of all 
acknowledgments of international entities. This figure counts the FSA and its successor, the FCA, as a 
single entity. 
158. This total is organized by jurisdiction rather than entity. It includes acknowledgments of 
all entities within the jurisdiction. 
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the Securities Commission of the Bahamas. They also acknowledged non-U.S. 
entities that were not securities regulators, such as police departments (e.g., the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Police Department of Tayside, 
Scotland) and public prosecutors (e.g., The Federal Prosecutor’s Office of 
Switzerland). 
The U.K. acknowledgments provide an example of the range of entities in 
the international context. The majority of acknowledgments were of the main 
securities regulator: the FSA and, later, the FCA. The remaining 
acknowledgments were more varied, although concentrated in law 
enforcement: City of London Police, Department of Trade and Industry, Her 
Majesty’s Treasury, the Serious Fraud Office, Crown Prosecution Service, 
Metropolitan Police Service, Hampshire Constabulary, and the Northumbria 
Police. 
In addition to other countries’ domestic authorities, the SEC 
acknowledged a few international or regional entities. These included the U.N. 
Independent Inquiry Committee and the African Development Bank. 
Both the international and domestic state acknowledgments included a 
few examples of generic acknowledgments (e.g., thanks to “foreign” regulators 
or to “state securities regulators”). In one large group, the SEC thanked 
“regulatory and law enforcement officials of more than a dozen foreign 
jurisdictions” for their help in a multi-million dollar “sophisticated and 
fraudulent international boiler room operation” conducted from Spain, Mexico, 
and the United States.159 
vi. Change in Entity Mix Over Time 
The entity mix has changed from year to year. At the beginning of the 
study’s time period, the acknowledgments concentrated on private SROs and 
Exchanges. Over time, though, the acknowledgments became dominated by 
federal entities. For every year from 2002 to 2018, half or more of all SEC 
acknowledgments were of federal entities. 
These changes are reflected in the chart below, which reports entity type 
as a percentage of total acknowledgments for each year.160 In addition to 
reporting by year, the time periods are marked by the composition of the SEC. 
The Commission is made up of five commissioners, with no more than three of 
a single political party.161 The U.S. President designates the chair.162 Figure 1 
 
159. Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Sues Four Individuals Behind Millennium Financial, Ltd., 
a $20 Million Fraudulent Boiler Room Operation (Mar. 18, 2004), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18624a.htm [https://perma.cc/4JFP-V5HD]. 
160. The totals do not add up to 100% because the “Other” category amounted to 0% to 2% 
per year. It is not depicted in the chart. 







below reports the president who appointed the SEC chair for the related time 
period.163 
Figure 1. Entity Type as Percentage of Acknowledgments 
 
The findings for state and local entities mirror those for international 
entities when averaged over the full time period, but their representation in the 
total mix goes in different directions over that period, with state and local 
representing a decreasing percentage and international an increasing one. 
Figure 2 below breaks down this comparison by year. It compares the 
acknowledgments of U.S. state and local entities with those of international 




163. A Clinton appointee was the chair from 1993 to 2001, Bush appointees from 2001 to 
2009, Obama appointees from 2009 to 2017, and Trump from 2017. See SEC Historical Summary of 
Chairmen and Commissioners, SEC (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm [https://perma.cc/A24D-65M8] (listing the Chairs 
and other Commissioners). 
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Figure 2. Acknowledgments of State/Local and International Entities (% of 
Acknowledgments) 
 
How many SEC acknowledgments are linked to international interaction? 
One way of addressing that issue is to look at the percentage of SEC releases 
that include an acknowledgment of one or more international entities. Of the 
releases that contained acknowledgments during the period, 15% (445 of 
2,959) acknowledged at least one international entity. Figure 3 below reports 
the change over time as a percentage of the SEC litigation and press releases 
containing acknowledgments and as a percentage of all of the SEC litigation 





Figure 3. SEC Releases That Acknowledge International Entity/Entities 
 
The 2007 peak is consistent with the description of the post-financial-
crisis focus on international coordination. The SEC’s Office of International 
Affairs, for example, has noted that efforts to “advance[e] international 
regulatory and enforcement cooperation . . . increased significantly after the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2008.”164 
The peaks do not correspond with the entry into MOUs or events that 
helped prompt the MOUs. The IOSCO MMOU came into effect in 2002, and 
the SEC became a signatory then.165 The IOSCO MMOU in turn was framed in 
part as a response to the September 11, 2001, attacks, which “underscore[d] the 
importance of expanding cooperation among IOSCO Members.”166 But there 
was not a corresponding jump in acknowledgments of international entities 
around that time. Moreover, no clear pattern emerges by comparing the number 
of international acknowledgments to the political composition of the 
Commission.167 
How much of this pattern is driven by changes in the type of enforcement 
actions being brought? For example, some types of actions may be more likely 
to involve multiple players and coordination. This study does not break down 
the releases by case type, so it cannot give a full response. However, a useful 
indirect comparison can be made to a category of cases likely to involve multi-
entity interaction: enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 
which prohibits bribery internationally.168 It is one of two areas that the 2018 
 
164. Office of International Affairs, SEC (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/oia/Article/oia-
about.html [https://perma.cc/3HAA-AHKD]. 
165. See IOSCO MMOU, supra note 60. 
166. Id. at 2. 
167. See Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, supra note 163. 
168. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, SEC (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml [https://perma.cc/D4RP-QYNG] (listing the SEC’s 
FCPA cases by calendar year); see also Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Clearinghouse, STANFORD 
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Co-Director of SEC’s Division of Enforcement identified as involving the 
“most transnational activity and, accordingly, the need for international 
cooperation.”169 The pattern of FCPA enforcement actions does not seem to 
drive the interactions here. According to one study, the first year that the SEC 
brought more than ten FCPA cases was 2007, with ups and downs since, but a 
high of twenty-nine cases in 2016.170 
2. Edges/Acknowledgments 
What do the connections (edges or links) between acknowledged entities 
represent? What is the activity or relationship that gives rise to the 
acknowledgment? Like some of the literature about acknowledgments, for 
simplicity, this study treats the links as a single class.171 Although this study 
was not designed to identify or quantify the relationship that the link 
represents, the same data source—the underlying litigation and press releases—
provides examples of the SEC’s own descriptions of the coordination that led 
to the acknowledgment. The information in the releases can be read in light of 
information about the SEC’s enforcement routines: information that triggers 
investigation, factual development and investigation, and the bringing of a 
formal SEC action, sometimes as part of a constellation of legal actions 
brought by multiple agencies. 
Of course, the SEC’s own descriptions of the underlying activity may not 
capture the motivations for acknowledgments. Indeed the task of identifying 
possible motivations is intertwined with open questions about the functions of 
institutional acknowledgments that are discussed below.172 Nonetheless, the 
releases and other information about the SEC’s enforcement practices can 
provide information about the stages of enforcement in which the 
acknowledged entities interact with the SEC. 
Taken together, these data suggest several possible overlapping categories 
of acknowledgments. Links may indicate: (1) participation in the investigation; 
(2) information sharing for the purposes of investigation, litigation, or 
prosecution; (3) referrals to or from the SEC; (4) parallel actions against the 
 
(2019), http://fcpa.stanford.edu/statistics-analytics.html [https://perma.cc/45CP-LKLF] (tracking DOJ 
and SEC enforcement actions under the FCPA). 
169. Stephen Peikin, supra note 23. The other area is “cryptoassets and ICOs,” but because 
this is a recent development, it provides a less useful metric over the long timeframe of this study. 
170. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Clearinghouse, supra note 167. 
171. Cf. Khabsa et al., supra note 10, at 358 (noting, in the context of scientific and academic 
citations, that the “edges” in the graph “might express discussions, help in writing a paper, or 
acknowledgment of funding” but “collaps[ing] for simplicity all the edges into one class”). But see 
Koniaris et al., supra note 44, at 143-52 (“Our modelling approach transforms legislation corpus into a 
multi-relational network: a network with a heterogeneous set of edge labels that can represent 
relationships of various categories in a single data structure.”). 
172. Questions about the function of organizational acknowledgments—why an agency would 





same target for the same conduct by different entities; (5) related support 
actions; and/or (6) reinforcement of formal arrangements.173 
(1) Participation in the investigation. Sometimes the underlying press or 
litigation release provides additional specifics about the nature of the 
coordination or the stage at which coordination occurred. It indicates, for 
instance, assistance in “conducting its investigation”174 in “investigating 
jointly,”175 or “in the investigation of the facts leading to this action.”176 
(2) Information sharing. Information sharing is clearly related to 
investigation but is identified here as a separate category because it is also 
relevant to other contexts, such as litigation or regulation. The underlying 
public releases generally do not refer to information sharing. However, the 
SEC develops the underlying concept in its enforcement MOUs, which often 
focus on sharing information among securities regulators internationally or 
among domestic entities.177 
(3) Referrals. The term “referral” is used to mean notification of another 
entity about underlying conduct that seems to be an appropriate subject for 
action by that entity. In this context, the term includes both referrals where the 
 
173. Cf. Khabsa, supra note 10, at 358 (citing Blaise Cronin et al., A Cast of Thousands: 
Coauthorship and Subauthorship Collaboration in the 20th Century as Manifested in the Scholarly 
Journal Literature of Psychology and Philosophy, 54 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 855 (2003)) 
(suggesting that acknowledgments in academic and scientific papers can be organized into the following 
“categories of acknowledgment”: “(i) moral support; (ii) financial support; (iii) editorial support; (iv) 
presentational support (e.g., presenting a paper at a conference); (v) instrumental technical support; and 
(vi) conceptual support, or peer interactive communication (PIC)”). 
174. See, e.g., Litigation Release, SEC, SEC v. Comparator Sys. Corp. (May 31, 1996), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr14927.txt [https://perma.cc/RF27-BWW5] (“The 
Commission acknowledges the assistance of the National Association of Securities Dealers in 
conducting its investigation.”); Litigation Release, SEC, SEC v. Shank (Sept 12, 1996), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr15040.txt [https://perma.cc/XE3T-8FRT] (The Commission 
acknowledges the assistance of the Chicago Board of Options Exchange and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers in investigating this matter.”). 
175. See, e.g., Litigation Release, SEC, SEC v. Cornerstone Prodigy Group, Inc. (Dec. 15, 
1999), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr16390.htm [https://perma.cc/M4B6-UVMU] (noting 
that the SEC, Texas State Securities Board, and the FBI “investigated jointly,” and acknowledging the 
“very valuable assistance” of the TSSB and FBI). 
176. Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Southmark Advisory Inc., Southmark, Inc., and 
Wendell D. Belden with Securities Fraud Based on Deceptive Sales Practices that Enriched Belden at 
His Clients’ Expense (Oct. 30, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17818.htm 
[https://perma.cc/57XX-JZHW]; see also Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Madoff Computer 
Programmers (Nov. 13, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21292.htm 
[https://perma.cc/V8WF-V6M9] (“The Commission acknowledges the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with which the 
Commission has coordinated its investigation.”). 
177. See, e.g., SEC & COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE VALORES OF ARGENTINA, MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING ON CONSULTATION, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE 
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 8 (Dec. 9, 1991), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/argentina.pdf [https://perma.cc/29FL-X9M6] 
(committing to help with “the conduct of investigations, litigation, or prosecutions in cases where 
information located within the jurisdiction of the requested Authority is needed to determine whether, or 
prove that, the laws or regulations of the State of the requesting Authority may have been violated”). See 
generally supra Section II.B. 
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referring entity does not bring its own action and also referrals for parallel 
action.178 
Litigation and press releases sometimes expressly identified referrals to 
the SEC from one of the acknowledged entities. Examples include referrals 
from the FBI,179 the NASD/FINRA,180 and state securities regulators.181 
Similarly, in its own reports, NASAA reports referrals from state 
securities regulators to the SEC.182  In annual reports, the SEC also sometimes 
reports the number of outgoing referrals it made to criminal authorities183 or 
foreign securities regulators.184 The SEC Enforcement Manual also discusses 
referrals at length.185 It provides the staff with guidance about incoming 
referrals received from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB), state securities regulators, Congress, and SROs; and outgoing 
“informal referrals” from the SEC to criminal authorities, SROs, the PCAOB, 
and state agencies.186 Taken together, these indicate that referrals form part of 
the SEC’s practice, and may be one activity that results in an acknowledgment. 
(4) Parallel actions. To what extent do the acknowledgments reflect 
parallel actions: actions by other government entities for overlapping conduct 
and targets? The study was not designed to identify parallel actions, but the 
 
178. The scope of referral used here is consistent with some of the SEC’s reports of referrals 
that include both “investigations that SEC continues to pursue, as well as referrals more appropriately 
handled by other regulators or authorities.” See SEC, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT 64 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2B5-PAN7]. 
179. See Litigation Release, SEC, SEC v. Greenline Capital Corporation (May 20, 2003), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18151.htm [https://perma.cc/9CZH-ALJZ] (“The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation referred this matter to the Commission and the Commission wishes to 
acknowledge the Bureau’s assistance.”). 
180. See Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Files Action Against CytoCore, Inc., CytoCore’s CEO, 
and the Company’s former Chairman for Trading and Compensation-Related Violations (Jan. 13, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21811.htm [https://perma.cc/KB97-JPDU] (“The 
Commission’s case resulted from a referral by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (‘FINRA’), 
and the Commission acknowledges FINRA’s assistance with its investigation.”); Litigation Release, 
SEC, SEC Files Emergency Civil Action and Obtains Asset Freeze Against Alleged Inside Traders (Feb. 
20, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18584.htm [https://perma.cc/4UVZ-44P8] (“The 
Commission gratefully acknowledges the assistance and cooperation of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, which referred this matter to the Commission.”). 
181. See, e.g., Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Freezes Assets of California Corporation that 
Received Proceeds of Fraudulent Investment Scheme (June 28, 2006), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2006/lr19744.htm [https://perma.cc/AP2G-BDHY] (“The 
Commission acknowledges Massachusetts Secretary of State William Francis Galvin’s Securities 
Division, which first alerted the Commission to Russo’s activities and at the same time imposed a 
temporary restraining order against Russo on May 25, 2006, requiring him to cease all investment 
advisory activities.”). 
182. NASAA 2017 Enforcement Report Based on 2016 Data, supra note 35 (reporting that its 
members made referrals to the SEC in approximately 164 cases in 2016). 
183. SEC, supra note 172, at 66 (reporting 134 referrals to criminal authorities). 
184. Id. at 44 (reporting 457 requests from foreign authorities in FY2010 and 492 in FY2011, 
while the SEC made 604 and 772 outgoing requests for the respective years). 
185. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 33, at 82-95. 
186. Id. The Enforcement Manual also discusses referrals of public tips and referrals involving 





underlying releases provide examples of both criminal and civil parallel actions 
by acknowledged entities. 
A criminal proceeding may be based on the same underlying conduct as 
an SEC action. The SEC thanked, for instance, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for 
the District of Massachusetts for “its efforts in prosecuting the parallel criminal 
case.”187 Other litigation releases “acknowledged the assistance” of a particular 
U.S. Attorney’s Office, while also reporting that that office had arrested the 
enforcement target for securities fraud.188 Others reported “related” criminal 
actions brought by acknowledged entities and criminal charges for the 
“schemes” described in the SEC’s complaint,189 or “parallel investigation.”190 
 
187. Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Obtains Final Judgment Against Daniel Thibeault, 
Massachusetts Investment Adviser Who Orchestrated $15M Fund Fraud (Sept. 26, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23654.htm [https://perma.cc/N9S4-E5HS]. 
188. See Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Seeks Emergency Relief Against New York City 
Broker Engaged in Identity Theft and Market Manipulation (Sept. 6, 2001), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17117.htm [https://perma.cc/KQ6K-ZXKH]; see also 
Litigation Release, SEC, SEC v. Baltimore Financial Group, Inc. (Nov. 13, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20807.htm [https://perma.cc/C3RZ-MDJ3] (“The 
Commission acknowledges the assistance of the North Carolina Secretary of State’s Securities Division, 
which conducted a parallel investigation of this matter and has arrested Huffman for criminal violations 
of the North Carolina Securities Act.”). 
189. See Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former Hedge Fund Manager Friedlander 
with Issuing False Accounting Reports to Investors and Fraudulently Converting Over $2 Million in 
Investor Assets (Oct. 24, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18426.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VH7J-MQJZ] (“The Commission acknowledges the assistance and cooperation in its 
investigation of the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, which 
today announced criminal charges against Friedlander in connection with both schemes described in the 
Commission’s amended complaint.”); Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former New York State 
Official and Top Political Advisor with Defrauding the N.Y. State Retirement Fund in Multimillion 
Dollar Kickback Scheme (Mar. 19, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20963.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7J5E-EBVK] (“The SEC acknowledges the assistance of the New York Attorney 
General’s Office, which today filed related criminal charges . . . .”); Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Files 
“Prime Bank” Securities Fraud Case Against Unregistered Utah Broker and His Company (Dec. 23, 
2002), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17909.htm [https://perma.cc/YGQ4-ZRPM] 
(including the US Attorney’s Office in its acknowledgments and noting that “[i]n a related matter, the 
United States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Virginia announced the indictment of Jones 
and others . . . , charging securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering and witness 
tampering stemming from the same fraudulent scheme that is the subject of the Commission’s 
complaint”). 
190. See Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former General Counsel of Amkor 
Technology, Inc. with Insider Trading (Apr. 18, 2007), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20079.htm [https://perma.cc/42FB-HRP4] 
(acknowledging the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and 
the FBI, “which conducted their own separate, parallel investigation resulting in criminal 
charges . . . .”); Litigation Release, SEC, Court Enters Permanent Injunction and Other Relief Against 
Carole Argo in Stock Options Backdating Case (Sept. 29, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20752.htm [https://perma.cc/7GDZ-NT4X] 
(acknowledging the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and 
the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, “which conducted a separate parallel criminal investigation”); 
Litigation Release, SEC, Court Enters Permanent Injunction and Penny Stock Bar Against Jeffrey 
Hayden in Market Manipulation Case (May 13, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20570.htm [https://perma.cc/56CH-2MT4] 
(acknowledging the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and the FBI, 
“which conducted a separate, parallel criminal investigation”); Litigation Release, SEC, SEC v. Gaeton 
S. Della Penna (May 21, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2014/lr22997.htm 
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Information about the acknowledged entities can also be used as a marker 
for parallel civil and criminal actions. Of 2,959 releases containing 
acknowledgments, 1,419 (48%) acknowledged a U.S. Attorney’s Office. The 
proxy for parallel criminal actions is rough: the U.S. Attorney is not the only 
criminal authority on the list of acknowledged entities. A criminal action could 
have been brought after the SEC’s public announcement. And the presence of 
the U.S. Attorney does not necessarily mean that a parallel action was brought; 
it could have been involved in some other way in the matter. 
Parallel civil enforcement actions can also be brought, and some releases 
noted that acknowledged civil authorities had brought an action based on the 
same underlying conduct.191 SEC releases in this study referenced parallel civil 
actions by the CFTC192 and state securities regulators, for instance.193 
(5) Related support actions. These actions are not for the same underlying 
conduct, but support the SEC’s investigation. For example, another entity may 
bring a criminal action against enforcement targets for lying to the SEC or may 
freeze assets in support of the SEC’s collection efforts. One litigation release 
announced, for instance, that a target had been indicted for perjury and for 
obstruction of justice relating to the SEC’s earlier (and unsuccessful from the 
 
[https://perma.cc/3M3T-TC3P] (“[T]he U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida today 
announced related criminal charges against Della Penna. The SEC acknowledges the substantial 
assistance of that office and the Tampa Division of the U.S. Secret Service in this investigation.”). 
191. The reference here is to enforcement actions by government entities for the same 
conduct, usually with overlapping targets or defendants. It does not include civil litigation by private 
litigants, whether individual or a class. 
192. See SEC Litigation Release No. 214614, supra note 149 (thanking the CFTC and noting 
that it filed a complaint against the same enforcement target on the same day as the SEC); SEC 
Litigation Release No. 18356, supra note 148 (acknowledging the CFTC’s assistance and noting that it 
“simultaneously commenced a civil lawsuit” against the same enforcement targets). 
193.  Litigation Release, SEC, Court Enters Final Judgment Against Massachusetts Hedge 
Fund Manager in Fraud Scheme (Sept. 17, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20723.htm [https://perma.cc/Y3V4-KV7Y] (“The 
Commission acknowledges the assistance of the Securities Division of the Secretary of State of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which previously filed a separate action against Andersen.”); 
Litigation Release, SEC, Criminal Charges Filed Against Massachusetts Investment Adviser for 
Defrauding Investors (July 8, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2013/lr22743.htm 
[https://perma.cc/T8TD-LQKP] (acknowledging the assistance of Secretary of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts William F. Galvin’s Securities Division and the CFTC, “both of which filed cases against 
EagleEye and Liskov”); Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Massachusetts Broker with Defrauding 
9/11 Widow (Mar. 23, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21897.htm 
[https://perma.cc/G2TX-DLDV] (“The SEC acknowledges and appreciates the assistance of the 
Massachusetts Securities Division, which today filed separate charges against [the target].”); Litigation 
Release, SEC, SEC Charges Massachusetts Company and Its Principal with Fraud in Connection with 
Unregistered Company Offering of Securities (Feb. 21, 2007), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20011.htm [https://perma.cc/H6M9-5X4S] 
(“[A]cknowledg[ing] the assistance” of the Massachusetts Securities Division and the Pennsylvania 
Securities Commission “which previously filed separate actions” against the same enforcement target); 
Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Obtains Asset Freeze in the United Kingdom Against Hedge Fund 
Manager (May 19, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20585.htm 
[https://perma.cc/FW5Y-XGXP] (“The Commission acknowledges the assistance of the Financial 
Services Authority of the United Kingdom and the Securities Division of the Secretary of State of the 





SEC’s perspective) insider-trading investigation and enforcement action.194 The 
litigation release thanked the U.S. Attorney’s Office for indicting the target for, 
among other things, having withheld information about his Swiss bank account 
from the SEC.195 Another litigation release thanked the Federation of St. Kitts 
and Nevis for “restrain[ing] over $1.3 million of defrauded investor funds” in 
support of an SEC action.196 
(6) Reinforcement of formal arrangements. Finally, the Article introduces 
the term “reinforcement thanks” to describe the acknowledgment of entities 
that are in formal or semiformal coordination relationships with the SEC, often 
via statute, rule, or MOU. Occasionally the underlying litigation or press 
release refers to a formal agreement,197 or to a task force, rather than a 
particular entity.198 In one case involving securities fraud and an attempt to 
scam the post-financial-crisis Troubled Asset Relief Progam (TARP), the SEC 
acknowledged a list of federal agencies and their inspectors general, then 
pointed to their formal grouping into a task force, noting that “[t]he SEC 
brought its enforcement actions in coordination with these other members of 
the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.”199 
These anecdotes showing that the SEC acknowledges entities in a formal 
arrangement with the SEC are bolstered by the data in this study. The 
acknowledged entities were grouped into those that had an enforcement MOU 
with the SEC and those that did not. Approximately 21% (104 of 490) of the 
entities were IOSCO MMOU signatories, members of NASAA, or had entered 
an international or domestic MOU with the SEC.200 
The proposed categories of acknowledgment—investigation, information 
sharing, referral, parallel action, support action, and reinforcement—may 
 
194. Litigation Release, SEC, Spanish Investor Indicted for Impeding SEC Investigation and 
Litigation Regarding $4.6 Million Insider Trading Scheme (July 5, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23591.htm [https://perma.cc/MH6N-VPTK] (“The SEC 
thanks the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois for its efforts in bringing this 
criminal action.”). 
195. Id. 
196. Litigation Release, supra note 159. 
197. See Litigation Release, SEC, The Commission Files Accounting Fraud Action Against 
Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products (Oct. 10, 2002), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17782.htm [https://perma.cc/YU84-GPDU] (“The 
Commission acknowledges the assistance of . . . the Belgian Ministry of Justice (pursuant to the 
provisions of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in effect between the United States and Belgium).”). 
198. See, e.g., Litigation Release, SEC, Court Grants Summary Judgment To Conclude Civil 
Case Against Former Enron CEO (Dec. 8, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2015/lr23422.htm [https://perma.cc/AMC3-B6JU] (thanking 
the Enron Task Force). 
199. Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former Officers and Supervisors at Taylor, Bean 
and Whitaker Mortgage Corp. and Colonial Bank with Securities Fraud and Related TARP Scheme 
(June 16, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22002.htm [https://perma.cc/VF67-
Z39G]. 
200. See infra Appendices A & B. This estimate counts entities as being party to an MOU if 
there was one at any time during the time period; the acknowledgment may have predated the entry of 
the agreement. 
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appear in combination. Different entities acknowledged in the same action and 
release may have different roles in relation to the matter. In one insider trading 
case, for example, the SEC “acknowledge[d] the assistance of NASD 
Regulation—which uncovered some of the trading at issue” and also the 
assistance of “the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of New 
Jersey in the investigation of this matter.”201 
The categories are not mutually exclusive. A single entity may fall into 
several acknowledgment categories. In fact, overlap is likely. For instance, 
information sharing is often one aspect of participation in an investigation. 
Moreover, given the focus of many of the MOUs on information sharing,202 
many acknowledgments that reinforce formal arrangements likely involve 
sharing information. 
The list is also not necessarily exhaustive. It categorizes the underlying 
coordination activity as identified by the SEC, but does not capture other 
possible reasons for acknowledgment. At least a few releases report actions that 
were not brought by the SEC—e.g., criminal actions. Although couched as 
acknowledgments, these releases could plausibly serve as a reminder that the 
SEC was involved in the action too (“remember our participation”).203 Generic 
 
201. Litigation Release, SEC, SEC v. Carl Stevens (July 18, 2003), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18238.htm [https://perma.cc/SM4W-VTZD]; see also 
Litigation Release, SEC, SEC v. Palladinio (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2015/lr23318.htm [https://perma.cc/5RFT-98WD] (“The 
Commission acknowledges the assistance of Suffolk County (Massachusetts) District Attorney Daniel 
F. Conley’s Office, whose office referred Palladino’s and Viking’s conduct to the Commission, and 
District of Massachusetts United States Attorney Carmen M. Ortiz’ Office, whose office prosecuted the 
federal criminal case against Palladino.”); Litigation Release, SEC, SEC v. Platinum Capital Advocates, 
Inc. (Feb. 26, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20016.htm 
[https://perma.cc/PA7B-R5YQ] (“The Commission acknowledges the assistance of the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission. The Commission also acknowledges the assistance of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation which conducted its own separate, parallel investigation.”). 
202. See supra Section II.B. 
203. Litigation Release, SEC, Georgia Trader Pleads Guilty to Hacked News Release Scheme 
(Aug. 4 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23610.htm [https://perma.cc/A88D-
TUAH] (“The SEC thanks the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Eastern District of New York and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation for their efforts in prosecuting the case.”); Litigation Release, SEC, 
Judgment Entered Against Defendant in SEC Insider Trading Action (Nov. 9, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23687.htm [https://perma.cc/XBK8-QWTQ] (“The 
SEC thanks the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Federal Bureau 
of Investigations for its efforts in prosecuting the case.”); Litigation Release, SEC, Massachusetts 
Investment Adviser Pleads Guilty to Fraud, Obstruction of Justice in $15M Fraud (Mar. 14, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23488.htm [https://perma.cc/SF5C-94XN] (“The 
Commission thanks the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts for its efforts in 
prosecuting the case.”); Litigation Release, SEC, Massachusetts Investment Adviser Sentenced to 9 
Years Prison for Fraud, Obstruction of Justice in $15M Fund Fraud (June 20, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23573.htm [https://perma.cc/RMP2-DMXY] (“The 
SEC thanks the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts for its efforts in prosecuting the 
case.”); Litigation Release, SEC, Software Executive and Two Friends Indicted for Conspiracy to 
Commit Insider Trading and Money Laundering (Oct. 21, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23674.htm [https://perma.cc/L7Q2-N3X7] (“The SEC 
thanks the Fraud Section of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division and the United States Postal 
Inspection Service for their efforts in bringing this criminal action, and the Financial Industry 





acknowledgments (e.g., of “state securities regulators”) are also not necessarily 
explained by these categories.204 
Finally, the degree of underlying assistance may vary. Although it likely 
does not make sense to put too much weight on the precise wording of the 
acknowledgment, it is worth observing that most acknowledgments simply 
acknowledged or “appreciated” the assistance of another agency or entity. A 
few acknowledgments, however, pointed to “substantial,” “significant,” or 
“valuable assistance.”205 One release suggested a reason for this, thanking the 
Houston FBI for its “significant assistance” in “bringing the Commission’s 
action and in coordinating the execution of its search warrant,” while in the 
next sentence merely acknowledging the “assistance” of the Texas State 
Securities Board in the investigation.206 
3. Network Characteristics 
What does this network of SEC acknowledgments look like? Network 
studies often look at the number of links between entities. Although early 
models assumed that the number of links was fairly evenly and randomly 
distributed in a network, empirical studies since have identified uneven 
 
Pleads Guilty to Obstructing an SEC Administrative Proceeding and Other Charges (Nov. 22, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23691.htm [https://perma.cc/KL4J-K9ET] (“The SEC 
thanks the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office for the Northern District of Texas, and the FBI’s Dallas Office for their efforts in investigating 
and prosecuting the case.”). 
204. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
205.  Litigation Release, SEC, Former Boiler Room Operator Sentenced to Six Years’ 
Imprisonment (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23512.htm 
[https://perma.cc/U4UG-CE5Z] (“[R]ecogniz[ing] the valuable assistance of the [FBI’s] Boston Field 
Office.”); Litigation Release, SEC, Former Diebold Sales Representative Settles SEEC Insider Trading 
Charges (Nov. 26, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20817.htm 
[https://perma.cc/P68A-U3KJ] (thanking the Philadelphia Stock Exchange for “its valuable assistance”); 
Litigation Release, SEC, Man Sentenced to Over 127 Years in Prison for Orchestrating a Massive 
Securities Fraud Scheme that Targeted Seniors; Two Others Also Sentenced (Sept. 29, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20753.htm [https://perma.cc/68KY-6SQB] (thanking 
the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office for their “substantial assistance in this matter”); 
Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Georgia and South Carolina Residents with Conducting “Prime 
Bank” Style Fraud Scheme (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23685.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7A64-AW6B] (“The Commission appreciates the significant assistance provided by 
the Securities Division of the Georgia Secretary of State’s Office.”); Litigation Release, SEC, SEC 
Charges Former Cleveland-Area Investment Promoter with $18 Million Scheme (Aug. 26, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2014/lr23073.htm [https://perma.cc/UR7M-MVVF] (“The 
SEC appreciates the substantial assistance of the Mexican Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores in 
the investigation of this matter.”); Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Freezes Assets of Unknown Traders in 
Suspected Insider Trading Ahead of Fortress Acquisition (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2017/lr23760.htm [https://perma.cc/Q4TM-W7WQ] (thanking 
FINRA for “its significant assistance in this matter”); Litigation Release, SEC, SEC v. E-Monee.com, 
Inc. (Mar. 19, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2013/lr22651.htm 
[https://perma.cc/499E-3NQL] (acknowledging the “substantial assistance” of the U.S. Secret Service); 
Litigation Release, SEC, SEC v. Gaeton S. Della Penna, supra note 190. 
206. Litigation Release, SEC, Federal Regulators and Criminal Authorities Coordinate 
Actions to Halt Illegal Internet Stock Offering Scheme (Sept. 6, 2000), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr16690.htm [https://perma.cc/3XPE-9EUA]. 
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numbers of links. In fact, many networks have a few hubs or connectors with 
many links, while a vast majority of nodes in the network have only a few 
links.207 
This Section asks similar questions of the SEC’s acknowledgment 
network, albeit in a nonmathematical way. Whereas the above discussions 
focused on the entities and edges, this section puts them together to look at the 
patterns of connection within the SEC’s acknowledgment network. 
To begin, the figure below provides a snapshot of one calendar year of the 
SEC’s acknowledgments. It depicts the SEC’s network of acknowledgments 
for 2016. The SEC is at the center. The straight dark lines are from the SEC to 
the entities it acknowledges in public releases. The curved lines are from entity 
to entity and represent the fact that the SEC acknowledged them within the 
same release, reporting the same enforcement action. The size of the circles for 
the nodes/entities increases as the entity is acknowledged more often. The 









Figure 4. The SEC’s Acknowledgment Network (2016) 
 
Although Figure 4 provides a snapshot of a single year, it is typical of the 
whole period (1998 through 2018). In particular, it reflects the predominance of 
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three repeat players accompanied by one-shotters.208 As noted above, the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices, FBI, and FINRA/NASD accounted for more than half of all 
acknowledgments in the full time period. The remaining acknowledgments are 
fairly evenly divided among categories of entity. 
The figure is grouped by entity category. One of the advantages of 
organizing it in that way is that connections among entity categories—from 
international to state, for instance—become more visible. In the 2016 figure, 
lines go from the New Hampshire Bureau of Securities Regulation to various 
Canadian securities regulators (for an enforcement action against a 
Massachusetts-based investment advisor).209 Connections that cross entity 
categories indicate that a single enforcement action may involve a mix of 
international entities and domestic state-level entities, as well as at least one 
federal entity, since the starting point is the connection to the SEC. Underlying 
releases include examples where the SEC acknowledged both international and 
domestic entities in the same action.210 
Another way of picturing the SEC’s network is to examine how many 
entities are involved in one enforcement action. The rough proxy for 
involvement here is the number of entities that the SEC acknowledges in a 
single release.211 Many litigation and press releases acknowledged only one 
entity. For the whole period, 37% (1,081 of 2,959) of releases containing 
acknowledgments thanked only one entity. 
The change over time in the mean number of entities thanked in a single 
release is reflected in Figure 5 below. Figure 5 reports the mean number of 
entities thanked per release, providing yearly means for comparison. It includes 
both litigation and press releases and reports two calculations. One is the mean 
number of entities acknowledged per release when only the releases containing 
an acknowledgment are considered. The second is the mean number of 
acknowledged entities for all releases, including those that have no 
acknowledgment at all.212 
 
208. See supra Section III.B.1. 
209. See Litigation Release, SEC, Federal Court Imposes $7.4 Million Judgment Against 
Massachusetts Investment Adviser Who Steered Money to Firms that Paid Him Consulting Fees (Dec. 
28, 2016),  https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23713.htm [https://perma.cc/EJ9U-LHA6]. 
210. See, e.g., Litigation Release, SEC, Federal Court Imposes $7.4 Million Judgment Against 
Massachusetts Investment Adviser Who Steered Money to Firms That Paid Him Consulting Fees, supra 
note 209; Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Nevada MicroCap Issuer and Individuals with 
Unregistered, Fraudulent Offering (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2018/lr24241.htm [https://perma.cc/8CP4-JL3D] (thanking 
“the various state, federal, and foreign authorities that provided valuable assistance in this matter”); 
Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Obtains Asset Freeze in the United Kingdom Against Hedge Fund 
Manager, supra note 193 (“The Commission acknowledges the assistance of the Financial Services 
Authority of the United Kingdom and the Securities Division of the Secretary of State of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which also filed an action against the parties.”). 
211. This proxy is rough because the agency may issue several releases relating to the same 
underlying conduct or action. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text. 
212. Not shown is a separate calculation that shows an increasing proportion of the releases 





Figure 5. Mean Number of Acknowledged Entities Per Release (1998-2018) 
 
Five key findings stand out from this study of the nodes, edges, and 
network characteristics in the SEC’s acknowledgments. 
First, the SEC predominately acknowledged the assistance of a few repeat 
players: U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the FBI, and FINRA entities. Together 
acknowledgments of these entities accounted for half of all acknowledgments 
in the period studied. 
Second, approximately half of the entities were acknowledged only once 
within the two-decade time period. 
Third, both international and domestic entities are part of the network, 
with a similar number of acknowledgments and unique entities in each 
category. 
Fourth, most acknowledged entities were not subject to one of the SEC’s 
enforcement MOUs or members of IOSCO or NASAA. 
Fifth, over time, the SEC has thanked an increasing number of entities per 
release. 
C. Function of Organizational Acknowledgments 
This Article generally treats acknowledgments as a rough proxy for 
agency interactions. Whom the SEC thanks indicates an underlying relationship 
or interaction, with a few main candidates for what that interaction may be.213 
Complicating this account are questions about the function of these 
 
213. See infra Section III.B.2. 
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acknowledgments in this governmental and organizational setting. The map of 
the SEC’s enforcement network thus raises an intriguing set of questions about 
how the act of acknowledgment reflects and affects network development and 
interactions. A few observations can be made here based on the study’s deep 
dive into the SEC’s acknowledgments, with the caveat that this study is a first 
step in an area that deserves further exploration.214 
First, the SEC does not seem to be alone in acknowledging other agencies. 
Although it is unclear how widespread a practice it is, examples exist. The 
CFTC seems to use quite similar language: “The CFTC appreciates the 
assistance of the National Futures Association in this matter.”215 Similarly, the 
DOJ noted that six different entities participated with the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office and the DOJ in a fraud investigation and “recognize[d] the substantial 
assistance of the SEC” and the assistance of the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN).216 The U.S. Attorney’s Office “commended special agents 
of IRS-Criminal Investigation,”217 and repeatedly lists various state and federal 
actors who participate in the investigation.218 Here too is an elaborated example 
from the EPA: 
Through the diligent work of EPA’s Criminal Investigation Division 
and their state and federal law enforcement partners, including the 
Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), the U.S. Army 
Criminal Investigation Command – Major Procurement Fraud Unit 
(USACID-MPFU), the U.S. Department of Transportation – Office 
of Inspector General, the Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality – Criminal Investigations Section, and Troopers from the 
Louisiana State Police Emergency Services Unit, the defendants 
were held accountable for their actions which endangered 
communities, defrauded tax payers, and resulted in multi-million 
 
214. A literature exists about gratitude and expressions of gratitude, but tends to focus on 
individual interactions, rather than entities or institutions. See, e.g., Shereen J. Chaudhry & George 
Loewenstein, Thanking, Apologizing, Bragging, and Blaming: Responsibility Exchange Theory and the 
Currency of Communication, 126 PSYCHOL. REV. 313 (2019). 
215. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Orders Commodity Trading Firm and Principal to Pay a 
$315,000 Civil Monetary Penalty for “Cherry-Picking” Scheme (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7862-18 [https://perma.cc/DA22-KADD]. 
216. Press Release, DOJ, supra note 14 (“The case is being prosecuted by . . . the Criminal 
Division’s Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys . . . of the Eastern District of Virginia. This case 
was investigated by SIGTARP, FBI’s Washington Field Office, FDIC-OIG, HUD-OIG, FHFA-OIG and 
the IRS-CI.”). 
217. Press Release, DOJ, Arvada, Colorado Businesswoman Sentenced to Prison for Filing 
False Corporate Income Tax Return (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/arvada-colorado-
businesswoman-sentenced-prison-filing-false-corporate-income-tax-return [https://perma.cc/D9MZ-
W4LL]. 
218. See, e.g., Press Release, DOJ, Maryland MS-13 Member Pleads Guilty in Violent 
Racketeering Conspiracy (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/maryland-ms-13-member-
pleads-guilty-violent-racketeering-conspiracy [https://perma.cc/J97J-U4HW] (“This case was 
investigated by HSI Baltimore, the Prince George’s County and Montgomery County Police 
Departments, the Prince George’s County State’s Attorney’s Office, the Takoma Park Police 
Department and the Montgomery County State’s Attorney’s Office, with assistance from the Prince 
George’s County Sheriff’s Office, HSI Baltimore’s Operation Community Shield Task Force and the 





dollar hazardous waste cleanup sites across Louisiana and 
Arkansas.219 
Second, and tied to the function of organizational acknowledgments, is 
the question of the intended audience for the SEC’s acknowledgments. Several 
possibilities are the thanked organization, Congress (funders of the SEC), 
supervisors of SEC staff, or the targets and potential targets of enforcement 
action. These are not mutually exclusive. Multiple audiences are also possible 
and different releases may have different aims. 
Thanks may be aimed at the entity that coordinated the enforcement, 
possibly to encourage repetition of cooperation.220 Acknowledgments may 
reinforce or acknowledge cooperation that is already formalized in an MOU or 
similar arrangement.221 Or it may be freestanding, inviting future cooperation 
from that particular entity. Even when entities are acknowledged only a single 
time, such acknowledgment might encourage cooperation from others in that 
particular category—international actors or state securities regulators, for 
instance—or from co-members of a centralized organization such as IOSCO or 
NASAA. 
One indication that the named entity is the intended audience is the use of 
acronyms or names of local police departments that may be unfamiliar to a 
more general reader: when the SEC thanks the East Lampeter Police 
Department, for instance, without any other details about location.222 Perhaps 
these acknowledgments are aimed at the thanked entity or those in the region 
who would be familiar with the case and local actors. 
The language of a few SEC releases suggests that the audience may not be 
the organization that is being acknowledged. In one release, the SEC 
acknowledged “the assistance of the Commission des Operations de Bourse 
(the French securities authority).”223 Another example thanked the Brazilian 
authorities, acknowledging “the Comissão de Valores Mobliliários (the 
 
219. Press Release, EPA, EPA and Law Enforcement Partners Announce Sentencing in 
Louisiana Explosive Waste Disposal Case (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-and-
law-enforcement-partners-announce-sentencing-louisiana-explosive-waste-disposal 
[https://perma.cc/DY32-DC4W]. 
220. Cf. Adam M. Grant & Francesca Gino, A Little Thanks Goes a Long Way: Explaining 
Why Gratitude Expressions Motivate Prosocial Behavior, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 946, 
946-47 (2010) (studying the effect of expressions of gratitude on individuals’ willingness to repeat their 
helping action and citing multiple experiments showing that “when helpers are thanked by the 
beneficiaries of their help, helpers are more willing to help these beneficiaries again”). 
221. Cf. Brummer, supra note 16 (noting that cooperation and reciprocity make MOUs more 
enforceable than their “soft-law” label suggests). 
222. Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Files Action for Securities Fraud Against Going Platinum 
and Alan H. Catalan (July 18, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18239.htm 
[https://perma.cc/UBJ6-MZXJ]; see also Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Charges Repeat Offender with 
New Investment Scam (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23509.htm 
[https://perma.cc/UZ74-F2EX] (acknowledging the “North Park Police Department”). 
223. Litigation Release, SEC, Seven Foreign Nationals Agree to Pay $1,267,240 to Settle 
Insider Trading Action Involving Purchases of FSA Stock (Mar. 1, 2002), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17388.htm [https://perma.cc/KWF5-P47P]. 
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Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil).”224 The added explanatory 
parentheticals might be directed at an audience other than the staff of the 
French or Brazilian securities authority itself, who presumably know their 
agency’s name. 
The funders and overseers of the SEC are another possible audience. 
There are indications that Congress is interested in the SEC’s ability to 
coordinate. A set of examples follows the 2007 financial crisis, where 
legislators pointed to the need for domestic financial regulators to coordinate 
with their international counterparts.225 
To the extent that the task of drafting the public press and litigation 
releases is given to individual SEC staff, another possible audience is the 
supervisors of those staff members. Interagency collaboration is reportedly a 
criterion in SEC performance reviews and the SEC created “cross-agency 
working groups” to facilitate cooperation.226 Strategic goals of the agency also 
include internal and external coordination.227 
Another possibility is that the list of acknowledged entities is aimed at the 
targets of enforcement, perhaps as a caution. This version relies on a robust 
view of the readership of these releases, maybe an overly robust view. 
However, these releases seem to filter through the press, at least for high-
profile cases.228 They might also filter to targets through lawyers, a conjecture 
bolstered by the existence of a specialized and repeat-player securities defense 
bar. 
 
224. Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Freezes Assets of Insider Trader in Burger King Stock 
(Sept. 21, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22486.htm [https://perma.cc/HU7T-
4EF7]. 
225. See Systemic Risk: Examining Regulators’ Ability to Respond to Threats to the Financial 
System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of Rep. Bachus) 
(“[G]iven the global nature of our financial markets, U.S. regulators must work closely with their 
international counterparts to promote cooperation . . . among regulatory bodies, and ensure that 
information about potential systemic risk is shared promptly.”); see also Statement from G-20 Summit, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/washington/summit-text.html 
[https://perma.cc/38ML-K2MF] (calling for “intensified international cooperation among regulators and 
strengthening of international standards”). 
226. Press Release, SEC, The SEC—Revitalized, Reformed and Protecting Investors (Nov. 
26, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-240-accomplishments.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8FX7-VG5J]. 
227. SEC, 2019 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 32, at 87 (“[T]o foster and enforce 
compliance with the federal securities laws, the SEC works closely with other agencies and foreign 
governments. . . . [T]o establish an effective regulatory environment, several SEC divisions and offices 
regularly collaborate with both internal and external partners.”); see also SEC, STRATEGIC PLAN, 
FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022, supra note 32 (noting that the “need for coordination with fellow financial 
regulators, including foreign regulators, will continue to rise,” pointing to “global risks” and the 
domestic effects of “wrongdoing [that] occurs outside our country”). 
228. See Verity Winship & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Admissions of Guilt in Civil Enforcement, 
102 MINN. L. REV. 1077, 1090-91 (2018) (giving examples of the filtering of information about 





IV. Implications and Future Work 
A. Methodological Lessons 
As noted above, one purpose of legal network studies such as this one is 
to figure out which tools fit well with legal materials and with the underlying 
policy questions. Accordingly, it is worth a few concluding notes on the 
methodological lessons one might take from this Article’s application of 
automated acknowledgment indexing to the SEC’s acknowledgments. 
First, it makes sense to think of automated acknowledgment indexing as a 
hybrid between automation and manual review. Automation broadens the scope 
of study, but the process also involves extensive manual human review and is 
far from an idealized simple push of a button. 
Second, limitations are inherent in any set of primary materials. The SEC 
study reported here allows definitive answers about the acknowledgments: 
whom the SEC thanked and when. But, while it is reasonable to track 
acknowledgments back to underlying interactions, the acknowledgments are 
only a proxy for underlying enforcement interactions, mediated by the agency’s 
own announcement practices and intermediate questions about the public 
releases and about thanking practices. 
One of its benefits in this context—enforcement—is that there are few 
other ways of identifying and quantifying enforcement interactions. Such a 
study is particularly useful as an indirect approach where information is not 
available elsewhere. However, a study like this one obviously depends on some 
form of available information. The project is enabled by the SEC’s 
longstanding practice of publicizing enforcement activity. 
Finally, the analysis was simplified by the standardization of the language 
in the public releases and the standardization of the format of releases. 
Litigation releases, in particular, lend themselves to automated review because 
of their limited subject matter (relating to court proceedings) and their 
standardized format. Press releases sometimes require more manual review 
because of the greater degree of variation in both form and subject matter. In 
other words, some standardization of language helped, although was not 
required, and this need will likely change as the tools change. 
B. Enforcement Implications 
One lesson for the SEC and the field of financial regulation is that 
enforcement structures have to account for the mix of repeat players and single 
interactions. These may require two different types of strategies, targeted either 
at an ongoing multicontact relationship or a one-off interaction. 
The SEC has self-consciously identified some of the entities that 
correspond to the most acknowledgments: the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the FBI, 
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and FINRA (and its predecessors). And in many cases an apparatus exists to 
govern these repeat relationships. For the FBI and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, 
manuals and guidance include detailed instructions about the interaction 
between civil and criminal parallel actions.229 It includes semiformal guidance 
about “pile on” penalties and how information may be shared in the context of 
parallel proceedings, given different criminal and civil protections.230 
Perhaps even more formally defined, sometimes in statute, are the 
relationships between the SEC and SROs like FINRA and the stock exchanges. 
This formality is unsurprising given the SEC’s ongoing supervision of these 
entities, and the interaction between SROs’ rules and enforcement and the 
SEC’s rules and enforcement—both contemplated in the securities statute that 
originated this relationship.231 
The most frequently acknowledged entities thus confirm many of the 
SEC’s own reports of its most frequent collaboration, although there are some 
relatively unsung entities in the mix. Notably, the U.S. Postal Inspectors are in 
the top ten for the full period but are sometimes overlooked in discussions of 
securities enforcement or coordinated criminal-civil actions, as well as in the 
SEC’s other materials.232 
The concentration of interactions with the top repeat players is only one 
aspect of this network; overall, single interactions with the SEC prevailed. 
Almost half of all entities were acknowledged only once in the multi-decade 
time period, and seventy percent were acknowledged three or fewer times. For 
these one-shotters, dense statutory and semi-formal guidance does not 
necessarily exist. 
One approach is to interact with these dispersed entities via a centralized 
organizing body—IOSCO in the international context or NASAA in the 
domestic and regional contexts. The findings thus highlight how important 
these organizations can be for coordinating communication between their 
member regulators and the SEC. Another approach is to use some of the 
mechanisms for gathering information from dispersed one-shotters in other 
contexts, perhaps whistleblowers and consumer or investor complaints. Part of 
the response may also be as simple as training and meeting with international, 
state, and local regulators,233 some of which is already built into SEC 
practices.234 
 
229. See, e.g., DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL § 1-12.100 (2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-1-12000-coordination-parallel-criminal-civil-regulatory-and-
administrative-proceedings#1-12.100 [https://perma.cc/HD74-MYA8] (providing for coordination of 
corporate-resolution penalties in parallel and/or joint investigations). 
230. Id. 
231. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3, 78s (2018). 
232. SEC, 2019 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 32, at 97 (noting collaboration with an 
extensive list of entities, but excluding the U.S. Postal Inspectors). 
233. Cf. Eugene Bardach, Can Network Theory Illuminate Interagency Collaboration? (Sept. 





The one-shotters cannot be ignored. A comparison can be made to the 
study of connections in other types of networks. A classic sociological study 
identified the importance of “weak ties” for job seekers.235 It found that 
information from acquaintances rather than close friends or family was often 
more important for job leads.236 The weak tie provided information from 
outside of the cluster of more intense ties; the closer and more intensely 
involved, the more likely they were to already have the same information rather 
than new information.237 A plausible analogy could be made to the SEC’s 
ongoing connections with the US Attorneys’ Offices versus the one-time 
information sources, which may be more likely to identify previously unknown 
conduct. 
The study is not designed to identify the specific interaction that led to an 
acknowledgment, so it provides limited information about the nature of the tie 
between the SEC and the acknowledged entity and the ties among the entities 
acknowledged in a single release. Although the releases suggest some of the 
underlying interactions that give rise to the acknowledgments,238 they do not 
distinguish between plausible accounts of the coordination that is taking place. 
One possibility is that the connections reflect the flow of information, 
especially tips and referrals that help uncover bad conduct. The underlying 
releases and reports from the SEC and other agencies suggest an active 
incoming and outgoing referral process.239 NASAA officials have suggested 
that state and local regulators are an important originator of information that 
prompts an action by the SEC and/or criminal authorities.240 
The SEC-acknowledgments data may reflect information coming into the 
SEC, with other entities acting as an information source.  But this is not the 
only possibility. Another is that the SEC sets a national law-enforcement 
agenda in the area of securities and enlists other entities. A question for further 
inquiry accordingly involves direction: is the SEC enlisting entities/referring 
cases, or is the entity providing information/flagging conduct for the SEC? 
 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/409f/53430f98dae83b526a92b03d515fea83432d.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QB7M-NJ5S] (discussing how agencies should coordinate to provide social services). 
234. See, e.g., SEC’s Technical Assistance Program, SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION (Apr. 8, 
2014), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_emergtech.shtml [https://perma.cc/7T66-EZLX]. 
235. Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 (1973). 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. See supra Section III.B.2 (identifying categories of conduct that may have led to 
acknowledgment). 
239. See supra notes 159-167 and accompanying text. 
240. See Ensuring Effectiveness, Fairness, and Transparency in Securities Law Enforcement: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 114-28 (2018) (“[S]tate securities regulators 
are often first to discover and investigate our nation’s largest frauds. . . . From the investigation into the 
role of investment banks in the Enron fraud, to exposing securities analyst conflicts, ‘market timing’ in 
mutual funds, and to uncovering problems in the auction rate securities market, state securities 
regulators have consistently been in the lead.”). 
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Finally, the findings provide a snapshot of a single agency, with the SEC 
as a common connector or a hub. But the SEC connects to other entities that 
themselves may be hubs. For example, a similar analysis may be possible for 
the interagency interactions of the CFTC, which has its own network of 
statutes, MOUs, and acknowledgments.241 The DOJ too has its own 
acknowledgment network.242 The Hong Kong securities authority is a non-U.S. 
example: it has information-exchange MOUs with four different domestic 
entities and formal connections to ten other countries and the European 
Union.243 The broader enforcement network is accordingly a potential area of 
further inquiry. 
C. The Networked Agency 
Agencies are sometimes thought of as solo actors as if they fulfill their 
duties alone, in solitary pursuit of their own statutory mandates. This 
perception is particularly common for independent agencies like the SEC, 
which are often viewed as insulated from the regulatory state. The findings 
here challenge the vision of the siloed agency, providing specifics about an 
agency that acts in coordination and demonstrating that it makes sense to think 
in terms of networks rather than solo actors. 
The findings also challenge existing literatures to look at both domestic 
and international actors and both state and federal domestic actors. Some 
literatures, especially in administrative law, depict the regulatory state as 
entirely domestic. And certainly the findings here reflect interactions between 
levels of government domestically, with both state and local regulators and law 
enforcement (and others) interacting with federal agencies and federal law 
 
241. See, e.g., Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Charges Forex Trader and Firm with Fraud and 
Registration Violations (Aug. 29, 2018), https://cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7778-18 
[https://perma.cc/LV94-56X9] (“The CFTC appreciates the cooperation and assistance of the United 
Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority and the New York State Office of the Attorney General.”); 
Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Releases Enforcement Division’s Annual Results (Oct. 24, 2013), 
https://cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/6749-13 [https://perma.cc/HM8K-TRG2] (describing its 
“[c]ooperation with Law Enforcement Partners” and noting that the “Division of Enforcement worked 
actively with federal and state criminal and civil law enforcement authorities, including by sharing 
information in just under 300 investigations and prosecutions”). 
242. See, e.g., Press Release, DOJ, supra note 14 (“The case is being prosecuted by . . . the 
Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys . . . of the Eastern District of Virginia. 
This case was investigated by SIGTARP, FBI’s Washington Field Office, FDIC-OIG, HUD-OIG, 
FHFA-OIG and the IRS-CI. The department recognizes the substantial assistance of the SEC. The 
department also recognizes the assistance of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of 
the Department of the Treasury.”). 
243. Exchange of Information, H.K. SEC. & FUTURES COMMISSION (June 1, 2018), 
https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/about-the-sfc/collaboration/overseas/exchange-of-information.html 
[https://perma.cc/2P3X-UXUS] (identifying MOUs with the SEC, CFTC, Office of the Comptroller of 





enforcement. The story of the SEC’s enforcement network is accordingly in 
part a story of domestic cooperation.244 
Other literatures, like the literature about the global securities markets, 
treat agency cooperation as primarily international.245 Part of the discussion in 
financial regulation is how U.S. regulators and enforcers interact with 
authorities from other countries to address conduct “in the global 
marketplace.”246 Certainly the findings reflect global cooperation: the SEC 
acknowledged more than seventy international jurisdictions and acknowledged 
international entities more than nine hundred times. The findings reflect both 
centralized coordination through IOSCO and decentralized coordination: the 
SEC’s one-time thanks to the Hampstead Constabulary, for instance. 
The findings here complicate both the domestic and international 
accounts, however. It is neither just a domestic-focused cooperative-federalism 
story, nor an international-coordination story. It is both. 
Overall, understanding the group behavior of agencies and the ways they 
rely on one another as resources can help paint a richer picture of the regulatory 
state and can inform a better understanding of the actions of individual 
agencies. Having an inaccurate model of agency behavior matters because it 
can lead to mispredictions and misunderstandings of agency decisionmaking. 
Being able to understand and model agency behavior more thoroughly thus 
offers important dividends in the form of a better understanding of the 
functioning of the regulatory state. 
Conclusion 
Problems are increasingly cross-border or borderless. In response, even 
agencies’ own materials point to the need for interaction and coordination 
among multiple entities. Current analytical approaches in the legal literature are 
not well suited to heterogeneous interactions that go in multiple directions and 
involve many types of entities in different locations. To understand 
enforcement in this interconnected context requires different tools. A natural 
place to look is at tools developed to understand other types of networks. This 
Article identifies one such tool, adding to the growing body of work analyzing 
legal networks. 
This Article uses the SEC’s enforcement network as an example. It 
demonstrates how a tool used to study social networks—automated 
 
244. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why 
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998) 
(discussing cooperative federalism); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 
92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983) (same). 
245. See supra note 19. 
246. See, e.g., Jisun Park, Enforcement of Securities Law in the Global Marketplace: Cross-
Border Cooperation in the Prosecution of Transnational Hedge Fund Fraud, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 231 
(2014). 
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acknowledgment indexing—can be used to identify specific coordinating 
entities and the changes over time. The study of the SEC enforcement network 
picks up, in part, that type of cooperation for particular investigations that 
would otherwise largely be unobserved, enriching the study of financial 
enforcement. By investigating enforcement networks, this Article also 
participates in an emerging literature about agency coordination outside the 
rulemaking context. 
But the Article’s basic intuition tackles a much broader category: all 
entities tasked with responding to classical cross-border problems that involve 
multiple jurisdictions and to problems driven by ubiquitous technological 
change that is untethered to geographical location. These require a networked 





Appendix A: The SEC’s International MOUs247 
Signatory Securities 
Regulators  
(with U.S. SEC) 
Date(s) Entered 
Argentina Dec. 9, 1991 
Australia Oct. 20, 1993 
Brazil July 1, 1988 
Canada Jan. 7, 1988; Sept. & Oct. 2015 
Chile June 3, 1993 
France Dec. 14, 1989 
Germany Nov. 22, 1993; Mar. 24, 1994; Oct. 17, 1997 
Hong Kong Oct. 5, 1995 
IOSCO248 December 19, 2002 
Israel Feb. 13, 1996 
Italy May 3 & 5, 1993 
Japan* May 23, 1986; May 17, 2002; Jan. 12 & 16, 2006 
Jersey* May 22, 2002 
Mexico Oct. 18, 1990 
Netherlands Dec. 11, 1989; July 1, 1992 
Norway Sept. 24, 1991 
Portugal Oct. 10, 1997 
Singapore* May 16, 2000 
Spain July 8, 1992 
Switzerland Aug. 31, 1982; Nov. 10, 1987; Nov. 3, 1993 
United Kingdom* Sept. 23, 1986; Sept. 25, 1991 
*The U.S. CFTC is also a signatory to at least one of the MOUs listed for this 
entity. 
 
247. Cooperative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators, supra note 52. 
      248.    See Press Release, SEC, SEC and CFTC Participate in the Signing Ceremony for the 
IOSCO Enhanced Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cross-Border Enforcement 
(May 20, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-71 [https://perma.cc/SY78-YHED]. 
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